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Public Perceptions of Insider Trading  
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The U.S. insider trading enforcement regime has been mired in 
controversy since the SEC introduced it in 1961.  Some have argued that 
the SEC should not regulate insider trading because it improves market 
performance.  Others have argued that the SEC must vigorously regulate 
insider trading because it is unfair and undermines market confidence.  
Arguments on both sides of this debate, however, rest on empirical claims 
that are rarely backed by data.  The resulting impasse has left lawmakers 
and jurists without a clear sense of what conduct they should proscribe 
and why.  This, in turn, has placed market participants in a state of 
confusion that has been exaggerated by insider trading’s being a common 
law offense, never having been defined by statute or rule.  But after sixty 
years, Congress appears poised to act.  With reform proposals pending, 
reliable empirical evidence of public attitudes concerning insider trading 
has never been more needed.  This Article presents the results of the first 
large-scale national survey of public attitudes regarding insider trading 
since 1986, and the first comprehensive, census-representative study ever 
conducted on the subject.  It offers valuable data to inform claims 
regarding public perceptions of, inter alia, the fairness of different forms 
of insider trading, its pervasiveness, and the public’s willingness to 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In October of 2018, Securities and Exchange Commissioner Robert 
Jackson, and former United States Attorney Preet Bharara, announced 
the creation of a task force to propose reforms to America’s “shoddy,” 
“unclear,” and “confused” insider trading laws.1  Jackson and Bharara’s 
concerns are not isolated.  As Professor Peter Henning noted, leading 
jurists regularly criticize the U.S. insider trading regime as being “a 
‘theoretical mess,’ ‘seriously flawed,’ ‘extraordinarily vague and 
ill-formed,’ ‘arbitrary and incomplete,’ a ‘scandal,’ and even 
‘astonishingly dysfunctional.’”2 
Much of the frustration stems from neither statute nor regulation 
ever defining “insider trading.”3  Congress and the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) have allowed the law to develop in the 
courts and administrative tribunals.4  But without the benefit of clear 
legislative guidance, the area’s sixty years of common law development 
has been neither linear in direction nor consistent in outcome.5  As a 
result, insider trading law “has suffered—and continues to suffer—from 
uncertainty and ambiguity to a degree not seen in other areas of the 
law.”6 
For the first time in U.S. insider trading law’s sixty-year history, 
broad-based momentum is building for comprehensive statutory 
reform.7  Congress recently introduced three comprehensive reform 
bills, each proposing a different statutory definition of “insider 
 
 1 Preet Bharara & Robert Jackson, Insider Trading Laws Haven’t Kept Up with the 
Crooks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/09/opinion/sec-
insider-trading-united-states.html. 
 2 Peter J. Henning, What’s So Bad About Insider Trading Law?, 70 BUS. LAW. 751, 751 
(2015) (footnotes omitted). 
 3 STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 26–27 (2d ed. 2007). 
 4 Id. at 28–29. 
 5 See infra Part II. 
 6 PREET BHARARA ET AL., REPORT OF THE BHARARA TASK FORCE 1 (2020). 
 7 Congress passed two insider trading laws in the 1980s, the Insider Trading 
Sanctions Act of 1984 and the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 
1988.  Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud 
Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 [hereinafter ITSFEA] 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  Although these statutes 
enhanced fines and penalties, neither defined “insider trading.” 
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trading.”8  In December 2019, one of these bills, the Insider Trading 
Prohibition Act, passed the House with a near-unanimous 410-13 vote.9  
In January 2020, the Bharara Task Force on Insider Trading issued a 
Report recommending comprehensive statutory reform similar in many 
respects to that passed by the House.10 
Reform should be deliberate and informed, lest the opportunity for 
comprehensive improvement be squandered.  After sixty years of 
controversy and inconsistency, Congress should implement a fair and 
efficient insider trading regime.  To the extent that it would impose 
criminal penalties, as it almost certainly would, it is particularly 
important that the reformers be clear about both the moral and 
economic harms the law strives to guard against alongside the good it 
seeks to promote. 
Congress would be remiss to engage in a statutory overhaul 
without considering the public’s attitudes concerning such conduct.  
Reformers repeatedly assert, as the principal justification for regulating 
insider trading, that the practice leads the public to “question the 
fundamental fairness and integrity of the markets.”11  But neither 
Congress nor the Bharara Task Force appear to have informed their 
proposed reforms with empirical evidence of what the public actually 
thinks of insider trading.12  Does the average American think that it is 
unfair to trade based on material nonpublic information?  If so, under 
what circumstances?  Would the average American be less willing to 
participate in markets if he or she knew that insider trading was 
prevalent?  Given the persistent debate over the ethics and economics 
of insider trading,13 it would be irresponsible simply to assume the 
answers to these questions. 
This Article looks to correct this empirical lacuna by presenting the 
results of the first large-scale national survey of public attitudes 
regarding insider trading since 1986, and the first comprehensive, 
census-representative study conducted on the topic.14  It offers a 
 
 8 See Stop Illegal Insider Trading Act, S. 702, 114th Cong. (2015); Ban Insider 
Trading Act, H.R. 1173, 114th Cong. (2015); Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 
114th Cong. (2015). 
 9 H.R. 2534, 116th Cong. (2019). 
 10 BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6, at 4. 
 11 Id. 
 12 The Report of the Bharaha Task Force, for example, offers no external support for 
its claim that “[m]ost agree that there is something fundamentally unfair about [insider 
trading].”  BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6, at 3.  Indeed, the report offers no evidence of 
public attitudes concerning insider trading.  See generally id. 
 13 See infra Sections III.D–E. 
 14 Perhaps the most frequently cited studies of public attitudes regarding insider 
trading are the pair of 1986 Business Week/Harris polls taken before and after the Ivan 
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detailed attitudinal assessment of public views about insider trading’s 
morality and legality (or lack thereof), as well as its effect on the public’s 
willingness to participate in equity markets.  The study breaks down its 
results by U.S. Census categories according to age, income, education, 
race, and political ideology. 
The results reflect some ambivalent attitudes concerning the ethics 
and harms associated with insider trading.  They raise several important 
questions.  For example, what does it mean that nearly a fifth of 
respondents would engage in insider trading even though they believe it 
to be immoral?  But this Article’s goal is not to draw strong conclusions 
from the survey’s results.  Instead, this Article presents the results in a 
manner that is useful to jurists, scholars, regulators, and legislators as 
they work to effect statutory reform.  To date, proponents of reform 
have speculated about what the public deems “fair” and “unfair.”15  They 
have assumed the impact of insider trading on market “integrity.”16  This 
survey’s results thus inform the public discourse using timely data. 
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II offers a brief history of 
insider trading law’s common law development and identifies some of 
the legal and theoretical issues that have motivated current reform 
 
Boesky insider trading scandal.  Business Week/Harris Poll: Outsiders Aren’t Upset by 
Insider Trading, BUS. WK., Dec. 8, 1986, at 34 [hereinafter Business Week 12/86]; Business 
Week/Harris Poll: Insider Trading Isn’t a Scandal, BUS. WK., Aug. 25, 1986, at 74 
[hereinafter Business Week 8/86].  Two more recent studies were published in 2011.  
Stuart P. Green & Mathew B. Kugler, When Is It Wrong to Trade Stocks on the Basis of 
Non-Public Information?: Public Views of the Morality of Insider Trading, 39 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 445 (2011); Meir Statman, Is it Fair?: Perceptions of Fair Investment Behavior Across 
Countries, 12 BEHAV. FIN. 47 (2011).  Professor Statman conducted a “convenience study,” 
a preliminary, nonprobability analysis of student views on the subject.  Id.  Professors 
Green and Kugler conducted a more sophisticated, but still exploratory, trio of studies 
using Amazon Mechanical Turk, https://www.mturk.com, to investigate American 
opinions.  Green & Kugler, supra, at 461.  Although neither constitutes a fully scientific 
survey, both were extremely helpful, and the current survey owes much of its design to 
Green & Kugler.  A 1961 Harvard Business Review article described a study in which 
executives were asked whether they would trade on information learned at a board 
meeting.  Raymond C. Baumhart, How Ethical Are Businessmen?, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 
1961, at 6–7. 
 15 See BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6. 
 16 Id. passim; see also United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 658 (1997) 
(“[I]nvestors likely would hesitate to venture their capital in a market where [insider 
trading] is unchecked by law.”).  Courts, regulators, and scholars often use “market 
confidence,” “market integrity,” and “investor confidence” interchangeably.  E.g., 
BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6 (using the term “integrity of our securities markets” to refer 
to what others may call “market confidence”); James J. Park, Rule 10B-5 and the Rise of 
the Unjust Enrichment Principle, 60 DUKE L.J. 345, 362–63 (2010).  This Article’s 
reference to the “market-confidence theory” of justification for regulating insider 
trading applies equally to claims concerning the impact of insider trading on “market 
integrity.” 
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efforts.  This Part concludes by outlining the principal goals of this study 
in light of current reform efforts.  Those familiar with insider trading 
law’s historical development and controversies may wish to turn 
directly to Part III, which describes the survey’s approach, methods, and 
limitations.  Part IV presents results and offers some preliminary 
explanations.  Part V outlines future studies contemplated by the 
Authors to supplement and complement this survey’s results. 
II.  THE STATE OF INSIDER TRADING LAW AND SCHOLARSHIP 
From its inception in the early 1960s, the insider trading 
enforcement regime in the United States—the first in the world—has 
been fraught with controversy, instability, and uncertainty. 
A.  Historical Development 
1.  The Common Law Era 
Before 1961, insider trading as it is understood today did not incur 
criminal or civil liability in any nation.17  In the United States, state 
common law of insider trading was divided.18  The majority of 
jurisdictions did not recognize a broad fiduciary duty of loyalty between 
board members or executive officers and individual shareholders in the 
context of stock trading.19  Courts did hold that “special facts” (e.g., 
evidence of affirmative misrepresentations or concealment) might give 
rise to an equitable duty for board members or senior management to 
disclose information advantages in advance of trading with 
shareholders, but not when trading over anonymous exchanges.20  By 
the early twentieth century, a minority of jurisdictions began 
recognizing a broad duty of loyalty among board members and senior 
management to disclose material nonpublic information to 
shareholder-counterparties in arm’s-length stock transactions in their 
 
 17 See, e.g., JOHN P. ANDERSON, INSIDER TRADING: LAW, ETHICS, AND REFORM 132–33 (2018); 
Utpal Bhattacharya & Hazem Daouk, The World Price of Insider Trading, 57 J. FIN. 75, 
89–90 (2002). 
 18 See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, INSIDER TRADING LAW AND POLICY 11–13 (2014). 
 19 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 23; see also Carpenter v. Danforth, 52 Barb. 
581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1868); Bd. of Comm’rs of Tippecanoe Cnty. v. Reynolds, 44 Ind. 509 
(1873).  
 20 See, e.g., Goodwinn v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661–62 (Mass. 1933) (holding 
insiders have no fiduciary duty to disclose when trading over impersonal exchanges); 
Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 431 (1909) (holding that board members and officers 
may have a duty to disclose before trading with shareholders upon a showing of “special 
facts”). 
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firm’s shares,21 but it remained entirely unclear whether even these 
courts would extend this duty to transactions over anonymous 
exchanges.22 
Before 1961, no state court had recognized a disclose-or-abstain-
from-trading rule for low-level insiders trading on their company’s 
material nonpublic information.23  Moreover, all the early state-law 
cases addressed the problem of insider trading as a matter of contract 
law or unjust enrichment.24  No states imposed civil fines or criminal 
liability for insider trading prior to the advent of the modern federal 
enforcement regime.25 
2.  Federal Regulation and the Modern Era 
Beginning in 1961, SEC Commissioner William Carey, a former 
Columbia law professor, made it something of a personal mission to 
introduce “insider trading” into the American lexicon of civil and 
criminal liability.26  Carey, however, confronted a significant obstacle.  
The SEC’s rulemaking enforcement power was limited by its statutory 
authority, and no statute expressly bars trading in securities on the basis 
of material nonpublic information.  Section 16 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (‘34 Act) proscribed short-swing trading by 
certain statutorily-identified insiders but was very limited in scope.27  
Further, only the issuer or its shareholders could bring an action under 
 
 21 See, e.g., Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903); Stewart v. Harris, 77 P. 277 (Kan. 
1904); Hotchkiss v. Fischer, 16 P.2d 531 (Kan. 1932). 
 22 See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 13–16. 
 23 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 24. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
 26 See, e.g., Kurt A. Hohenstein, Fair to All People: The SEC and the Regulation of 
Insider Trading: The SEC Takes Command, SEC HIST. SOC’Y, http://www.sechistorical.org/
museum/galleries/it/takeCommand_a.php (last visited Jan. 10, 2020).  Carey’s personal 
devotion to this principal may have blinded him to the potential for chaos in the regime 
he crafted.  Current reform efforts should avoid this pitfall and be based on broad public 
sentiment, not the preferences of any individual. 
 27 See 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).  Section 16(b) imposes only limited restrictions on a limited 
number of statutorily defined insiders’ (“directors,” “officers,” and “principal 
stockholders”) ability to trade.  15 U.S.C. § 78p.  Its trading restrictions are also quite 
limited.  It provides that any profits earned by these insiders from a purchase and sale 
(or a sale and purchase) of their company’s shares that occurs within a period of less 
than six months are recoverable by the issuer—regardless of whether the insider traded 
bases on material nonpublic information.  15 U.S.C. § 78p(b).  Section 16(c) also makes 
it unlawful for these insiders to sell their company’s shares short.  15 U.S.C. 78p(c).  It 
does nothing to restrict trading by insiders who possess material nonpublic information, 
but are not “directors,” “officers,” or “principal shareholders.”  Even statutorily defined 
insiders are not precluded from trading based on their firms’ material nonpublic 
information if their trading does not fall within the short-swing period. 
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the statute, and it could not form the basis of a federal civil or criminal 
enforcement action.28  Undeterred, Carey and the SEC began bringing 
insider trading actions under the ‘34 Act’s general anti-fraud provision 
in Section 10(b). 
Section 10(b), implemented as Exchange Act Rule 10b-5,29 
prohibits the employment of “any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance” in “connection with the purchase or sale of any security.”30  
Carey brought an insider trading action under Section 10(b), for the first 
time since the sections’ 1934 enactment, in In the Matter of Cady, Roberts 
& Company.31  He wrote Cady, Roberts himself, and because the case was 
settled, his opinion was subject to neither adversarial fact testing nor 
judicial review.32  Cady, Roberts introduced the violation of insider 
trading by interpreting Rule 10b-5 broadly “to encompass the infinite 
variety of devices by which undue advantage may be taken of 
investors.”33  With the stage thus set, Carey offered the first articulation 
of the “disclose-or-abstain rule” whereby persons  
must disclose material facts which are known to them by 
virtue of their position but which are not known to persons 
with whom they deal and which, if known, would affect their 
investment judgment.  Failure to make disclosure in these 
circumstances constitutes a violation of the anti-fraud 
provisions.  If, on the other hand, disclosure is prior to 
effecting a purchase or sale would be improper or unrealistic 
under the circumstances, we believe the alternative is to 
forego the transaction.34 
Chairman Carey explained that this broad duty to disclose or 
abstain from trading was justified as deriving, first, from the “existence 
of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information 
intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the 
personal benefit of anyone, and second,” due to “the inherent unfairness 
involved where a party takes advantage of such information knowing it 
is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing.”35  These words were 
controversial from the start. 
 
 
 28 15 U.S.C. § 78p; see also BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 226. 
 29 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 30 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 31 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961). 
 32 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 33 n.30. 
 33 In re Cady, Roberts & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961). 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. at 912. 
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Concerning Carey’s first justification for the broad disclose-or-
abstain rule, as noted above, state common law had never recognized so 
broad a duty for insiders trading in their own companies’ shares.36  
Concerning the second justification, it is not obvious that trading on an 
information advantage is “inherently unfair,” even when the 
information is not immediately accessible to the counterparty.37  
Philosophers, economists, and jurists have debated this question for 
millennia without clear resolution.38  Indeed, for two hundred years, 
courts have cited Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in Laidlaw v. Organ 
for the proposition that, absent evidence of affirmative fraud, a 
contracting party is not typically required to disclose even a material 
information advantage to a counterparty.39 
In addition to controversy over Carey’s moral justification for the 
broad disclose-or-abstain rule outlined in Cady, Roberts, economists 
immediately challenged the rule’s economic justification.  Among the ‘34 
Act’s principal purposes is the promotion of the efficiency, 
transparency, and accuracy of markets.40  But Henry Manne famously 
argued that insider trading actually promotes market efficiency and 
transparency.41  Others have challenged this view, but one side has yet 
to convince the other.42 
In sum, the U.S. insider trading enforcement regime was 
introduced in 1961 as the brainchild of a former law professor and 
newly appointed SEC Chairman.  It lacked statutory definition and clear 
historical or common law precedent.  Its moral and market-based 
 
 36 See supra Section II.A. 
 37 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 143–60. 
 38 See, e.g., CICERO, DE OFFICIIS 321 (Walter Miller, trans., 1913) (outlining Stoic 
philosophers’ contrasting views on the ethics of trading based on information 
asymmetries); see also Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the 
Law of Contracts, 7 J.L. STUD. 1 (1978) (arguing that a party’s ability to trade based on an 
information advantage should turn on whether the information was acquired 
deliberately or casually); Randy Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and Contract 
Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 783, 796 (1992) (suggesting that sometimes a party suffering from an information 
disadvantage in a proposed transaction does not have the right to ask for more 
information); Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of 
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 140 (1982) (suggesting that some parties enjoying 
information advantages have a right to be dishonest in response to some inquiries in 
order to protect their advantages). 
 39 Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. 178 (1817). 
 40 See e.g., Will Kenton, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/s/seact1934.asp (last updated Oct. 30, 2020) 
(noting that the ‘34 Act was created for the purpose of “ensuring greater financial 
transparency and accuracy and less fraud or manipulation”). 
 41 See HENRY MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966). 
 42 See infra Section II.B.2. 
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justifications were controversial from the beginning.  But the regime 
took flight.  It received the imprimatur of the federal courts in 1968 in 
SEC. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.,43 in which the Second Circuit gave the 
Cady, Roberts disclose-or-abstain rule its broadest expression.  The 
court explained that the “only regulatory objective” for Rule 10b-5 “is 
that access to material information be enjoyed equally.”44  The court 
thus held that Cady, Roberts’s duty to disclose or abstain should place all 
traders on an “equal footing,” and therefore applies to “anyone in 
possession of material inside information,” without regard to insider 
status.45 
3.  The Supreme Court Weighs In 
Texas Gulf Sulphur’s articulation of American insider trading law 
demanding equal access to (or even a parity of) information46 in 
securities transactions held sway until the U.S. Supreme Court 
addressed the issue in Chiarella v. United States in 1980.47  While 
working as a “mark-up” man for a financial printer, Vincent Chiarella 
decoded documents to discover the targets of tender offers before they 
were made public.48  He then profited from trading on this material 
nonpublic information.49  Because Chiarella’s employer was hired by the 
purchasing companies, he was not an actual or constructive insider at 
the targets and, therefore, had no cognizable fiduciary or similar duty to 
the targets’ shareholders.  Consistent with Texas Gulf Sulphur, the 
Second Circuit held that Chiarella’s status as an outsider was not crucial 
to his liability, holding that “[a]nyone—corporate insider or not—who 
regularly receives material nonpublic information may not use that 
information to trade in securities without incurring an affirmative duty 
 
 43 SEC. v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 851 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 44 Id. at 849. 
 45 Id. at 848, 851–52. 
 46 An “equal-access” insider trading regime precludes trading by those who have 
acquired material nonpublic information via special access to sources that are 
structurally closed to other market participants (e.g., from an employer)—regardless of 
whether such trading breaches a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence. 
ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 118.  A “parity-of-information” regime precludes trading 
based on all material nonpublic information regardless of its source (e.g., picking up a 
draft earnings report that was misplaced on a bus).  Id.  
 47 445 U.S. 222 (1980).  The Supreme Court addressed insider trading as a matter of 
federal common law in Strong.  Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).  The Court first 
addressed insider trading under the federal securities statutory regime in Chiarella. 
 48 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224. 
 49 Id. 
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to disclose.”50  The Supreme Court reversed, expressly rejecting a “parity 
of information” or equal-access theory of liability.51 
In an opinion authored by Justice Lewis Powell, Jr., the Chiarella 
Court held that while Section 10(b) is “aptly described as a catchall 
provision . . . what it catches must be fraud.”52  But because Chiarella 
made his trades over anonymous exchanges, he never made false 
representations to his counterparties.  Such trading, Chiarella held, is 
fraudulent only if one party trades based on material nonpublic 
information that “the other [party] is entitled to know because of a 
fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence between 
them.”53  
The Court acknowledged common law support for the proposition 
that corporate insiders bear such a duty to disclose before trading with 
their shareholders,54 and therefore recognized what has since come to 
be known as the “classical theory” of insider trading liability.55  Under 
that theory, a corporate insider who trades in his or her own company’s 
shares on the basis of material nonpublic information breaches a 
fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence to the current or 
prospective shareholder-counterparty.56  
Because Chiarella was not an insider at the target corporations in 
whose shares he traded, he owed no such duty of disclosure to his 
counterparties.  The trial court therefore erred by instructing the jury 
that Chiarella “owed a duty [of disclosure] to everyone; to all sellers, 
indeed, to the market as a whole.”57  The Court held that Texas Gulf 
Sulphur’s parity-of-information rule “departs radically” from the 
fiduciary-fraud-based model demanded by fealty to Section 10(b) and 
“should not be undertaken absent some explicit evidence of 
congressional intent.”58  The Court instructed that permitting some 
 
 50 United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis in 
original). 
 51 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233. 
 52 Id. at 234–35. 
 53 Id. at 228 (alteration in original). 
 54 Id. at 227–28. 
 55 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651–52 (1997) (noting that under “the 
‘traditional’ or ‘classical theory’ of insider trading liability, § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 are 
violated when a corporate insider trades in the securities of his corporation on the basis 
of material, nonpublic information”).  
 56 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230. 
 57 Id. at 231. 
 58 Id. at 233.  Though the Court does not mention Texas Gulf Sulphur in connection 
with its rejection of the parity-of-information rule, the rule it rejects is the same as that 
which was laid out in that case, and which was relied upon by the Second Circuit in 
upholding Chiarella’s conviction.  For example, the Second Circuit decision noted that 
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market participants to trade on insurmountable information 
advantages may be unfair, but “not every instance of financial unfairness 
constitutes fraudulent activity” under Section 10(b).59  The equal-access 
model for insider trading liability that had been advanced by the SEC 
and had reigned for nearly twenty years was dead. 
Yet, no sooner had the Court killed the equal-access model than the 
SEC set to work reviving it (or at least its scope of liability) by 
rulemaking and more expansive interpretations of the law.  Six months 
after Chiarella was handed down, the SEC adopted Exchange Act Rule 
14e-3.60  This new rule imposed liability on anyone possessing “material 
information [that relates] to a tender offer [by another person,] which 
information he knows or has reason to know is nonpublic and . . . [was] 
acquired, directly or indirectly,” from that person or the issuer of the 
securities that are targeted by the tender offer.61  Although limited to the 
tender-offer context, Rule 14e-3 dispensed with the requirement that 
the trade be made in violation of a fiduciary or similar relationship, 
immediately expanding insider trading liability to capture 
Chiarella-type trading.62 
The SEC also sought to push the limits of the classical theory of 
liability in the tipper-tippee context in Dirks v. SEC.63  In that case, Ronald 
Secrist, a former insider at a publicly-traded insurance company, shared 
material nonpublic information about an ongoing fraud taking place at 
his former employer with Raymond Dirks, a securities analyst.64  Secrist 
“urged Dirks to verify the fraud and disclose it publicly.”65  Although 
Dirks did not trade on this tip, a number of his clients whom he informed 
about the fraud sold out of their positions in the insurer.66  When the 
fraud came to light (largely due to Dirks’s efforts), the insurer’s stock 
 
Chiarella “recognizes, moreover, that since SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur . . . it has been Black 
letter law that ‘anyone in possession of material inside information must either disclose 
it to the investing public, or . . . must abstain from trading.’”  United States v. Chiarella, 
588 F.2d 1358, 1364 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 59 Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232. 
 60 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3.  This rule was adopted pursuant to the SEC’s authority 
under Sections 14(e) and 23(a) of the ‘34 Act.  15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(e), 78w(a).  Tender 
Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 17120, 20 S.E.C. Docket 1350 (Sept. 4, 1980), at *15 
(noting that the “Commission hereby adopts rule 14e-3. . .pursuant to Sections 14(e) 
and 23(a) of the Exchange Act). 
 61 See generally id. 
 62 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3. 
 63 463 U.S. 646 (1983). 
 64 Id. at 648–49. 
 65 Id. at 649. 
 66 Id. 
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price plummeted and the company entered receivership.67  The SEC 
promptly brought an enforcement action against Dirks for encouraging 
his clients to trade on Secrist’s information.68 
The SEC’s theory of Section 10(b) tippee liability was that “[w]here 
tippees—regardless of their motivation or occupation—come into 
possession of material ‘corporate information that they know is 
confidential and know or should know came from a corporate insider,’ 
they must either publicly disclose that information or refrain from 
trading.”69  The Supreme Court, Justice Powell again writing, rejected 
this theory as relying on the same logic that failed in Chiarella, 
reminding the SEC that Section 10(b) does not “require equal 
information among all traders.”70  The Court explained that “mere 
possession of nonpublic information does not give rise to a duty to 
disclose or abstain; only a specific [fiduciary-like] relationship does 
that.”71  Indeed, as a matter of public policy, such a broad parity-of-
information rule would risk damaging markets by impeding analysts in 
“ferret[ing] out and analyz[ing] information .  .  .  by meeting with and 
questioning corporate officers and others who are insiders.”72  To 
protect such beneficial information gathering, and consistent with 
Chiarella, the Court held that 
a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a 
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information 
only when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and 
the tippee knows or should know that there has been a 
breach.73 
An insider or tippee breaches this duty where the insider seeks to 
personally benefit from his or her disclosure to the tippee: “Absent some 
personal gain [by the tipper], there has been no breach of duty to 
stockholders.  And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative 
breach” by the tippee.74  Because Secrist tipped Dirks only to expose an 
ongoing fraud (and not to benefit personally), he did not breach his 
fiduciary duty to the insurer’s shareholders, so Dirks committed no 
 
 67 Id. at 650. 
 68 Id. at 650–51. 
 69 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 651. 
 70 Id. at 656–57. 
 71 Id. at 656 n.15. 
 72 Id. at 658. 
 73 Id. at 660. 
 74 Id. at 662. 
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derivative breach.75  The Supreme Court recently affirmed Dirks’s 
personal-benefit test in Salman v. United States.76  
Despite setbacks in Chiarella and Dirks, the SEC and prosecutors 
continued to press for broader Section 10(b) insider trading liability.  In 
particular, the government started prosecuting market participants 
under a new fraud-based theory that would extend to corporate 
outsiders.  In briefing Chiarella, prosecutors argued that Chiarella had 
“breached a duty to the acquiring corporation when he acted upon 
information that he obtained by virtue of his position as an employee of 
a printer employed by the corporation.”77  The Court rejected this theory 
as to Chiarella because it had not been presented to the jury, but did not 
rule on the merits78 of this “misappropriati[on]” theory of Section 10(b) 
insider trading liability until it decided Carpenter v. United States.79 
Carpenter involved well-known Wall Street Journal columnist R. 
Foster Winans, who regularly tipped the confidential pre-publication 
contents of his stock-picking column to friends who then traded on this 
information in advance of the article’s release.80  The resulting trading 
profits (approximately $690,000) were shared among the scheme’s 
participants.81  Because Winans owed no fiduciary duty to the 
shareholders of the stocks he picked in his column, he was not liable 
under the classical theory of insider trading.  Prosecutors instead 
charged that Winans breached a fiduciary duty to the Wall Street Journal 
by misappropriating its confidential pre-publication information and 
that he did so “in connection with” the purchase or sale of securities 
because “the scheme’s sole purpose was to buy and sell securities at a 
profit based on advance information of the column’s contents.”82  Justice 
Powell apparently lobbied the other justices to grant certiorari “to reject 
the misappropriation theory once and for all.”83  But in a twist of history, 
Powell retired before Carpenter was argued.84  Consequently, the 
 
 75 Dirks, 463 U.S. at 666. 
 76 137 S. Ct. 420, 427 (2016). 
 77 Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 235 (1980) (emphasis added). 
 78 Id. at 236. 
 79 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987). 
 80 Id. at 23. 
 81 Id. 
 82 Id. at 24. 
 83 Kurt A. Hohenstein, Fair to All People: The SEC and the Regulation of Insider 
Trading: Counterattack from the Supreme Court, SEC HIST. SOC’Y, 
http://www.sechistorical.org/museum/galleries/it/counterAttack_d.php#ftn43. 
 84 Id. 
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Carpenter Court split four-to-four on the misappropriation theory’s 
legality.85 
With the common law of insider trading in “limbo,” the SEC sought 
help from Congress and proposed a statutory definition of insider 
trading.86  Although Congress apparently stood ready to enact some 
version of the proposed statute, the SEC ultimately backed off, 
preferring, for enforcement, the common law’s flexibility over statutory 
certainty.87  Congress did, however, respond to the SEC’s calls for 
enhanced enforcement tools by passing the Insider Trading and 
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 (ITSFEA).88  ITSFEA increased 
civil and criminal penalties generally, and extended the civil penalty of 
treble damages to “controlling persons” who “knew or recklessly 
disregarded the fact that [a] controlled person was likely to engage in 
[insider trading] and failed to take appropriate steps to prevent such” 
trading.89  A principal purpose of this provision was to “increase the 
economic incentives” for corporations to “supervise vigorously their 
employees” through compliance programs and by other procedures.90 
Despite questions concerning its legal validity, the SEC and 
prosecutors continued to bring misappropriation-theory cases for the 
next decade until the theory of liability finally received the Supreme 
Court’s imprimatur in United States v. O’Hagan.91  James O’Hagan was a 
partner at a law firm representing Grand Metropolitan PLC in its tender 
offer for Pillsbury Company.92  Although O’Hagan did not work on the 
merger, he learned its details from others at the firm.93  He profited more 
than $4.3 million by trading ahead of the merger.94  The classical theory 
 
 85 Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 24. 
 86 See generally Joseph Grundfest, Commissioner, SEC, Is the Sky Really Falling? The 
State of Insider Trading Law After the Winans Decision, Address at the Federal Bar 
Association (Jan. 26, 1988). 
 87 Id. at 2 (then-Commissioner Grundfest suggesting that it was best to put insider 
trading on the “legislative back burner” to allow the law “to evolve on a case-by-case 
basis in the courts”); see JONATHAN R. MACEY, INSIDER TRADING: ECONOMICS, POLITICS, AND 
POLICY 64 (1991) (quoting Congressman John Dingell as explaining that statutorily 
defining insider trading would “narrow [rather than enhance] the SEC’s ability to bring 
enforcement actions”). 
 88 ITSFEA, supra note 7. 
 89 Pub. L. No. 100-704, § 21A(b)(1)(A), 102 Stat. 4677; 15 U.S.C. § 78u-1(b)(1)(A).  
Issuers were previously subject only to normal damages for derivative liability for their 
employees’ insider trading violations under the ‘34 Act’s Section 20(a). 
 90 WILLIAM K.S. WANG & MARC I. STEINBERG, INSIDER TRADING 814–15 (3d ed. 2010) 
(quoting H.R. Rep. No. 100-910, at 17). 
 91 521 U.S. 642 (1997). 
 92 Id. at 647. 
 93 Id. 
 94 Id. at 648. 
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did not apply because he was neither an actual nor a constructive 
insider at Pillsbury.  His trading, therefore, breached no fiduciary or 
similar duty of trust and confidence to his counterparties.  Prosecutors 
charged him under the misappropriation theory and Rule 14e-3.95  
O’Hagan embraced the misappropriation theory, whereby anyone 
(insider or outsider) incurs Section 10(b) insider trading liability if he 
or she misappropriates “confidential information for securities trading 
purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the information.”96 
The Court reasoned that it would make little sense, under the 
classical theory, to hold an attorney liable for trading while representing 
a tender-offer target but fail to impose the same liability on an attorney 
who trades while representing the offeror.97  The Court explained that 
the two theories should be understood as “complementary”: 
The classical theory targets a corporate insider’s breach of 
duty to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the 
misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of 
nonpublic information by a corporate “outsider” in breach of 
a duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the 
information.98 
O’Hagan thus satisfied the “deceptive device or contrivance” 
requirement of Section 10(b) by “dup[ing]” his principals—his firm and 
its client—out of the exclusive use of their information by trading on it 
despite its confidentiality.99  
O’Hagan was also significant in that it offered the Court its first 
opportunity to address the question of whether the SEC had exceeded 
its legal authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3.  The Eighth Circuit had 
held that Rule 14e-3 was ultra vires to the extent that it imposed insider 
trading liability absent proof that the trading breached a duty of trust or 
confidence; in so holding, the court concluded that “fraud” must mean 
the same thing in the ‘34 Act’s Section 14(e) as it means in Section 
10(b).100  The Supreme Court held that it did not have to decide the 
question of whether the SEC had defined “fraud” inaccurately in Rule 
14(e) because Congress intended 14(e) as a “prophylactic” against fraud 
in the tender-offers context.101  As such, “under § 14(e), the Commission 
may prohibit acts not themselves fraudulent under the common law or 
 
 95 Id. at 648–49. 
 96 Id. at 652. 
 97 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659. 
 98 Id. at 652–53. 
 99 Id. at 653–54. 
 100 Id. at 670–71. 
 101 Id. at 672–73. 
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§ 10(b), if the prohibition is ‘reasonably designed to prevent .  .  .  
acts and practices [that] are fraudulent.’”102  The Court did, however, 
limit its approval of the Rule 14e-3’s application to the facts of O’Hagan 
and other cases “of this genre.”103  But it remains unclear how far the 
Court’s approval of the SEC’s exercise of its § 14(e) prophylactic power 
under Rule 14e-3 would extend in cases where the trade did not breach 
a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence.104 
4.  Twenty-First Century Developments and Unresolved 
Questions 
With O’Hagan, all the basic elements of insider trading liability 
enjoyed the Supreme Court’s imprimatur: Section 10(b) insider trading 
liability (civil or criminal) arises where one looks to personally benefit 
from trading on, or tipping to another, material nonpublic information 
in breach of some fiduciary or similar duty of trust and confidence to the 
counterparty to the trade (classical theory) or the information’s source 
(misappropriation theory).105  But certainty as to insider trading’s basic 
elements has brought little clarity to the scope of the law’s application. 
Each element of Section 10(b) liability admits of substantial 
ambiguity and controversy that continues to bedevil market 
participants, the defense bar, and the government.106  For example, 
there exists significant disagreement over what constitutes a “personal 
benefit,”107 when trading is “on the basis of” information,108 when 
information is “material”109 or “nonpublic,”110 what type of “fiduciary 
 
 102 Id. at 673. 
 103 O’Hagan, 521 U.S. at 672, 676. 
 104 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 49 (noting that O’Hagan left open the possibility of 
reviewing, on different facts, the SEC’s authority in promulgating Rule 14e-3). 
 105 See supra Section II.A.3. 
 106 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 59–87. 
 107 E.g., BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6, at 8 (“Theories of insider trading have come and 
gone, and elements of the offense that once seemed well-settled (like the ‘personal 
benefit’ test) have at times been thrown into doubt by unexpected or unclear language 
in court decisions.”). 
 108 E.g., John P. Anderson, Anticipating a Sea Change for Insider Trading Law: From 
Trading Plan Crisis to Rational Reform, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 339, 347–50 (2015); Donald C. 
Langevoort, “Fine Distinctions” in the Contemporary Law of Insider Trading, 2013 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 429 (2013); Carol B. Swanson, Insider Trading Madness: Rule 10b5-1 and the 
Death of Scienter, 52 UNIV. KAN. L. REV. 147 (2003).   
 109 E.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway, Just Do It! Specific Rulemaking on Materiality 
Guidance in Insider Trading, 72 LA. L. REV. 999 (2012); Joan MacLeod Heminway, 
Materiality Guidance in the Context of Insider Trading: A Call for Action, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 
1131 (2003). 
 110 E.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 678 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“The [SEC] 
tells persons with inside information that they cannot trade on that information unless 
they disclose; it refuses, however, to tell them how to disclose.”).  The SEC has not since 
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relation” triggers the duty to disclose,111 and whether that relation must 
be one of “trust and confidence” (as articulated by Chiarella)112 or “trust 
or confidence” (as defined by SEC rule).113  The range of possible 
resolutions to these uncertainties has the potential to significantly 
expand or contract insider trading liability. 
The SEC tends to interpret ambiguities in the law expansively so 
that the scope of liability will coextend with its original parity-of-
information or equal-access vision, at least so far as courts will permit 
it.114  When the courts have pushed back against expansive theories of 
liability, the SEC resorted to rulemaking.115  In 2000, for example, in 
response to judicial resistance to the SEC’s position that “possession,” 
rather than “use,” in trading of material nonpublic information 
constituted trading “on the basis of” such information, the SEC 
promulgated Rule 10b5-1.116  Rule 10b5-1 defines trading “on the basis 
of” such information as simply trading while “aware” of such 
information.”117  Similarly, in response to some courts’ restrictive 
interpretation of when a fiduciary or similar duty of trust and 
confidence arises in the context of the misappropriation theory, as in the 
context of familial relationships,118 the SEC adopted Rule 10b5-2 to 
provide explicitly for such a duty.119  Adopting these rules, however, did 
little to settle the legal controversy, which simply shifted to the question 
of whether the SEC had statutory authority to promulgate these rules.120 
More recently, a dispute arose in the criminal context regarding the 
extent to which prosecutors can end-run around some of the harder-to-
prove elements of Section 10(b) insider trading liability, like 
 
issued a rule on what constitutes proper disclosure, or when information is “public,” 
preferring a case-by-case approach.  WANG & STEINBERG, supra note 90, at 145. 
 111 E.g., ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 75–78. 
 112 See supra text accompanying note 53. 
 113 Langevoort, supra note 108, at 445.  
 114 See supra Section II.A.3. 
 115 See supra text accompanying notes 60–62. 
 116 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 71–74 (noting that the SEC adopted Rule 
10b5-1 to resolve a split among circuits in the “use versus possession” debate). 
 117 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-1(b). 
 118 See, e.g., United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 568 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 
503 U.S. 1004 (1992) (holding that a marriage relationship alone did not create a 
fiduciary or similar relation of trust and confidence for insider trading purposes). 
 119 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2(3) (providing, inter alia, that there is a presumption of a 
relation of trust or confidence among spouses, parents, children, and siblings for 
purposes of insider trading liability). 
 120 See, e.g., Langevoort, supra note 108, at 445 (noting that some courts have 
questioned Rule 10b5-2’s validity on the ground that trading does not constitute a 
breach of confidentiality and, further, a promise of confidentiality is not necessarily 
fiduciary). 
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tipper/tippee liability’s “personal benefit” test, by bringing the cases 
under other federal fraud statutes.  The Securities and Commodities 
Fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1348, was adopted as part of the 2002 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act.  Congress presumably intended this statute to apply 
to accounting fraud.121  The Second Circuit nevertheless held in 
Blaszczak v. United States that Section 1348 applies to insider trading122 
and that it effectively overrules Dirks in the criminal context by 
removing the personal-benefit element of tipper/tippee liability.123  
Blaszczak so held despite Section 1348’s tracking Section 10(b)’s 
language nearly verbatim.124  If Blaszczak is upheld, insider trading law 
will be burdened with still another controversy: proving criminal 
liability under Section 1348 will be easier than proving civil liability 
under Rule 10b-5.125 
* * * 
Lacking meaningful statutory side rails, the common law evolution 
of insider trading law has yielded an enforcement framework whose 
basic liability elements are problematically vague.  Notwithstanding the 
Supreme Court’s insistence on a fiduciary-fraud model, this vagueness 
has permitted the government to expand liability to the point of 
near-equivalence with the SEC’s original vision of an equal-access or 
parity-of-information model.  The result is a schizophrenic insider 
trading regime that the Supreme Court has shown little willingness to 
treat.126 
B.  Challenges and Controversies 
1.  The Harmful Consequences of Ambiguity in the Law and 
Call for Reform 
The tension in insider trading law imposes on the investing public 
some of the harms that the securities laws were implemented to 
prevent.  Its vagueness has resulted in significant uncertainty for 
traders, issuers, and the broader market.  As Jackson and Bharara put it, 
 
 121 See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Defendant-Appellants’ 
Petition for Rehearing and for Rehearing En Banc at 4–7, United States v. Olan, 2020 WL 
1040819 (2020). 
 122 United States v. Blaszczak, 947 F.3d 19, 36–37 (2d Cir. 2019). 
 123 See Andrew N. Vollmer, The Second Circuit’s Blaszczak Decision: Dirks Besieged 
(Jan. 11, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3516082.  
 124 See Karen E. Woody, The New Insider Trading, 52 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 594, 616 (2020). 
 125 Id. at 600, 615 (noting that the SEC cannot bring actions under Section 1348 
because it lacks criminal-enforcement power). 
 126 See, e.g., ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 80 (noting with respect to Salman, the Court’s 
first insider trading case in nearly 20 years, which did little more than reaffirm Dirks, 
that many “were surprised that the Court had waited so long to say so little”). 
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the area’s “legal haziness . . . leaves both investors and defendants 
unclear about what sorts of information-sharing or other activities by 
investors would be considered insider trading, and what are the 
acceptable forms of data-gathering and research that are part of any 
healthy, functioning financial marketplace.”127  Such uncertainty, 
combined with the threat of what some have termed “draconian” 
sanctions, places market efficiency at risk and raises significant due 
process concerns.128 
The lack of clarity may, for example, force fund managers to refrain 
from making trades that will benefit their investors simply because the 
law gives them no clear guidance (even with the assistance of counsel) 
on whether the trade is perfectly legal or will land them in prison.129  
Similarly, this lack of clarity leaves compliance departments at issuers 
and financial institutions helpless in drafting clear insider trading 
compliance programs.130  
Issuers and financial institutions thus find themselves in difficult 
situations.131  For, given that corporations can be held derivatively liable 
for their employees’ insider trading,132 and that prosecutors have 
signaled that they will look to compliance programs to determine 
whether to prosecute corporations (and the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines look to compliance in determining their “culpability 
score”),133 issuers are compelled to institute overbroad “play-it-safe,” 
compliance programs that end up precluding good-faith, efficient 
trades.134  Paradoxically, insider trading law’s ambiguities may inhibit, 
rather than promote, proper market functioning.135 
Moreover, in Kolender v. Lawson, the Supreme Court held that, to 
satisfy the demands of due process, “a penal statute [must] define the 
criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can 
understand what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not 
 
 127 Bharara & Jackson, supra note 1. 
 128 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Incorporating State Law Fiduciary Duties into the Federal 
Insider Trading Prohibition, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1189, 1191 (1995). 
 129 See, e.g., BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6, at 1 (noting that the law’s vagueness has “left 
market participants without sufficient guidance on how to comport themselves”). 
 130 See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Solving the Paradox of Insider Trading Compliance, 88 
TEMP. L. REV. 273, 287–95 (2016).  
 131 Id. at 295–96. 
 132 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a). 
 133 See, e.g., Justice Manual Section 9-28.300, available at https://www.justice.gov/
jm/jm-9-28000-principles-federal-prosecution-business-organizations#9-28.300; see 
also U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, U.S. SENT’G GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2014). 
 134 See Anderson, supra note 130, at 295. 
 135 Id. at 296. 
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encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”136  With SEC 
commissioners, prosecutors, and sophisticated market professionals 
confounded, insider trading law’s due process tension is palpable,137 
even if the courts have never held it to be unconstitutional. 
The historic justification for vagueness in the law of insider trading 
has been that it aids enforcement by granting maximum flexibility to the 
SEC and federal prosecutors in bringing their cases.138  Although such 
justifications should be regarded with a dubious eye in liberal 
democracies, they may have some merit in limited circumstances where 
the risks to the public are particularly great and the criminal penalties 
are moderate.139  Whether insider trading over anonymous exchanges is 
economically harmful or unethical has been hotly contested since 
Chairman Cary introduced the crime in the early 1960s,140 and the 
criminal penalties for insider trading are severe (up to twenty years 
under Section 10(b),141 and up to twenty-five years under Section 
1348).142 
For these and other reasons, scholars and jurists alike have reached 
near unanimity in their call for reform,143 and Congress is poised to 
act.144  It would, however, be unwise to respond to sixty years of 
controversy over the appropriate scope of insider trading liability (with 
some arguing that the practice should be legal) by adopting a hastily 
drafted statutory definition.  Any new statute should be informed by a 
clear understanding of the economic harms and moral wrongs that the 
law will target.  As the following two subsections explain, the availability 
of up-to-date empirical evidence will be crucial to achieving informed 
insider trading reform.  
  
 
 136 Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
 137 See Homer Kripke, Manne’s Insider Trading Thesis and Other Failures of 
Conservative Economics, 4 CATO J. 945, 949 (1985) (arguing that Rule 10b-5 should be 
declared “unconstitutionally vague”). 
 138 BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 143 n.30. 
 139 For example, the law sometimes imposes strict liability for “public welfare 
offenses” where the risks to the public concerning particularly dangerous conduct are 
great.  See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 252–56 (1952).  Such crimes, 
however, are usually accompanied by minimal penalties.  Id. at 256. 
 140 See infra Section II.B.2. 
 141 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a). 
 142 18 U.S.C. § 1348. 
 143 See, e.g., BHARARA ET AL, supra note 6, at 1; Henning supra note 2, at 751. 
 144 See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. 
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2.  Ongoing Debate over the Economics and Ethics of Insider 
Trading 
Since Professor Henry Manne’s germinal 1966 book, Insider 
Trading and the Stock Market, scholars have debated the economic 
impacts of insider trading.145  Manne and others have argued that it can 
generate net benefits to securities markets.  For example, insiders are 
ideally situated to assess the true value of their own companies in real 
time.  To the extent that their trading affects stock prices, it pushes them 
toward greater accuracy more efficiently, with lower litigation risk than 
formal disclosure.146  Professor Jonathan Macey argues that the price 
accuracy offered by insider trading is crucial to healthy markets because 
it fosters efficient capital allocation.147  
Insider trading may also provide a useful “market-smoothing” 
function.148  If insiders trade leading up to disclosure, price moves 
gradually rather than suddenly as happens when markets must digest 
information quickly.  This “dampening of price fluctuations decreases 
the likelihood of windfall gains and increases the attractiveness of 
investing in securities for risk-averse investors.”149  Insider trading may 
thus make markets more attractive for many investors. 
Economists have also identified insider trading’s benefits for 
issuers.  Price movements from insider trading can serve as “red flags” 
to management of a fraud or some other issue, allowing management to 
isolate and address the problem in real time without having to wait “for 
the bureaucratic pipeline to deliver a memorandum.”150  Insider trading 
can also serve as an efficient means of executive compensation, offering 
savings to shareholders in terms of reduced executive salaries, while 
incentivizing and rewarding in-firm entrepreneurship.151 
 
 145 MANNE, supra note 41. 
 146 See, e.g., Stephen Bainbridge, Insider Trading, ENCYC. OF L. & ECON. § 5650 (1999); 
Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 
857, 868 (1983); Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and the Law Professors, 23 VAND. L. 
REV. 547, 548 (1970). 
 147 MACEY, supra note 87, at 10 (adding that “misallocation of society’s resources will 
lead to unemployment, low productivity, and higher interest rates”).  
 148 Manne, supra note 146, at 574. 
 149 Bainbridge, supra note 146. 
 150 MACEY, supra note 87, at 37; Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual 
Markets, and the Dog that Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 176, 181 (2005) (also noting 
that some firms set up internal virtual-trading markets to inform their 
decision-making). 
 151 Ian Ayers & Steven Choi, Internalizing Outsider Trading, 101 MICH. L. REV. 313, 338 
(2002); Manne, supra note 146, at 579.  There is some empirical evidence that issuers 
do adjust salary based on the stringency of the firms’ insider trading policies.  E.g., M. 
Todd Henderson, Insider Trading and CEO Pay, 64 VAND. L. REV. 505, 509–10 (2011). 
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Economists have also identified potential harmful effects of insider 
trading.  The adverse-selection model holds that if insider trading is 
prevalent, “because of order imbalances and the difficulty of sustaining 
a liquid market only with matching [orders], a liquidity provider has to 
transact with his own inventory and thus bears the risk of consistently 
buying ‘high’ from and selling ‘low’ to insiders.”152  Market makers will 
respond by increasing their bid-ask spreads to compensate for 
consistently losing trades against insiders.  This effective tax on all 
market participants may lead to reduced liquidity, and therefore an 
increase in the issuer’s cost of capital.  The higher a firm’s cost of capital, 
the less flexibility it will have to grow.153 
Insider trading also has the potential to create moral hazard.  
“[I]nsider trading might simply be an inefficient private benefit of 
control that accrues to managers and other insiders.”154  Managers 
might delay disclosures to provide time to free up capital for their trades 
or to allow time for their tippees to trade.155  And because insiders can 
profit from any stock-price movement, they may have the perverse 
incentive to generate bad news in order to profit from short positions in 
their own company’s shares.156 
Insiders may deprive the owner of material nonpublic 
information—the issuer or insider’s employer—of its “right of exclusive 
use.”157  Where insider trading violates the issuer’s instructions or is 
misappropriated, it is hard to dispute that some harm results.158 
The question of insider trading’s net economic impact is far from 
resolved.  As one commentator put it, the empirical evidence supporting 
the theoretical economic arguments for and against insider trading is 
“so limited and weak that any conclusions .  .  .  should be regarded with 
 
 152 Stanislov Dolgopolov, Insider Trading and the Bid-Ask Spread: A Critical Evaluation 
of Adverse Selection in Market Making, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 83, 98 (2004). 
 153 Laura Nyantung Beny, Insider Trading Laws and Stock Markets Around the World: 
An Empirical Contribution to the Theoretical Law and Economics Argument, 32 J. CORP. L. 
237, 249 (2007); Dolgopolov, supra note 152, at 100–01; see supra note 147 and 
accompanying text. 
 154 Beny, supra note 153, at 243. 
 155 See Roy A. Schotland, Unsafe at Any Price: A Reply to Manne, Insider Trading and 
the Stock Market, 53 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1448–49 (1967); Morris Mendelson, The Economics 
of Insider Trading Reconsidered, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 470, 476–77 (1969). 
 156 See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Securities and Secrets: Insider Trading and the Law of 
Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 117, 149 (1982).  
 157 United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 654 (1997). 
 158 If such trading did not impose some cost on the information’s source, there would 
be no reason for the owner of the information to have denied the right to trade on it in 
the first place.  See, e.g., Ayers & Choi, supra note 151, at 354–55 (noting that “the traded 
firm itself . . . is much better situated to decide whether particular classes of informed 
trading are socially beneficial”). 
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restraint.”159  Yet the area’s key players appear unfazed by this impasse, 
likely because many proponents of insider trading regulation justify it 
in attitudinal terms.  They typically justify harsh penalties for insider 
trading as necessary to protect “investor confidence” by ensuring that 
markets are perceived as “fair.” 
3.  Market Confidence, Fairness, and the Importance of 
Empirical Evidence of Public Attitudes to Reform Efforts 
Protecting the perceived confidence in the “fairness” and “integrity 
of our securities markets” is perhaps the most frequently-cited 
justification offered in defense of insider trading laws.160  Three basic 
premises appear to be implicit in the market-confidence theory: (1) a 
large portion of the general public believes that insider trading is unfair 
and pervasive; (2) this widespread perception leads those who share it 
to reduce or end their market participation; and (3) rigorous 
enforcement of insider trading is, therefore, necessary to prevent the 
harsh consequences to markets (e.g., reduced market liquidity and 
increased issuer cost of capital) that would result from (2).161 
But, as premises (1) and (2) above reflect, the market-confidence 
theory turns on empirical claims concerning public attitudes.  It would 
be imprudent to push forward with new legislation statutorily 
criminalizing insider trading based on the market-confidence concern 
without validating these claims.162 
 
 159 Laura E. Hughes, The Impact of Insider Trading on Stock Market Efficiency: A 
Critique of the Law and Economics Debate and a Cross-Country Comparison, 25 TEMP. INT’L 
& COMP. L.J. 479, 505 (2009); accord Charles C. Cox & Kevin S. Fogarty, Bases of Insider 
Trading Law, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 353, 357 (1988) (“it cannot conclusively be said that the 
economic benefits outweigh the costs of prohibiting insider trading” because “[t]he 
comparative costs and benefits have not been quantified”) 
 160 BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6, at 1; Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading: Final 
Rule, 65 Fed. Reg. 51,715 (Aug. 24, 2000); accord Bainbridge, supra note 128, at 1234 
(ranking “maintaining public confidence in the securities market” as one of the principal 
rationales for regulating insider trading); H.R. Rep. No. 100-910, at 7–8 (1988) 
(expressing concern that investors will not participate in markets perceived to be 
“rigged” by insider trading); Steve Schaefer, Wall Street Sheriff Preet Bharara Talks 
Insider Trading, FORBES (Jul. 18, 2012, 3:58 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/steve
schaefer/2012/07/18/wall-street-sheriff-preet-bharara-talks-insider-trading/#727e0
a2b6690; see supra notes 15–16 and accompanying text (Bharara asserting that 
aggressive prosecution of insider trading is important to enliven “confidence in the 
market”). 
 161 See, e.g., John P. Anderson, Insider Trading and the Myth of Market Confidence, 56 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1, 1–2 (2018). 
 162 See Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the Task Force on 
Regulation of Insider Trading, 41 BUS. L. 223, 227–28 (1985) (“Although the task force 
knows of no empirical research that directly demonstrates that concerns about integrity 
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Similarly, appeals to fundamental “fairness” as a justification for 
the regulation of insider trading are rarely accompanied by rigorous 
philosophical demonstration.163  Instead, arguments concerning the 
fairness of insider trading typically assume that “most agree,” or appeal 
to “common sense.”164  Such appeals demand empirical 
support—particularly in the context of insider trading where, as noted 
above, the law has permitted parties to profit from trading based on 
“unerodable” information asymmetries for centuries without regarding 
it as unfair.165  Consequently, it seems wise to empirically determine 
whether the public actually thinks it is fundamentally unfair, and under 
what circumstances. 
Finally, one risk in basing legislative codification, particularly in the 
criminal law, on current public attitudes is that, even if empirical 
evidence supports the claim that these attitudes are shared, the public 
may be misguided or wrongheaded in holding these views.  Such false 
consciousness may result from cultural bias, media spin, incomplete 
information, and the like.  It is therefore important that lawmakers be 
apprised of any empirical evidence suggesting public attitudes are 
adulterated by such factors. 
Although there have been efforts to sound public attitudes 
concerning insider trading in the past,166 this Article’s goal is to inform 
reform efforts by providing the first large-scale, census-representative 
national survey on the topic since 1986.  In what follows, Part III 
describes the survey instrument and Part IV presents the results. 
III.  THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
The survey’s primary goal was to update and broaden the state of 
knowledge of national views on insider trading.  First, it aimed to 
advance the state of the art of insider trading knowledge by creating a 
more nuanced and comprehensive catalog of societal perceptions about 
the field.  The hope is that, combined with future work,167 it will provide 
 
affect market activity, both authoritative commentators and common sense tell us that 
if investors do not anticipate fair treatment, they will avoid investing in securities.”). 
 163 See, e.g., BAINBRIDGE, supra note 18, at 192 (noting that the usual “vague and poorly 
articulated notions of fairness surely provide an insufficient justification for [insider 
trading] prohibition”). 
 164 BHARARA ET AL., supra note 6, at 3; Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, 
supra note 162, at 227. 
 165 See Selective Disclosure and Insider Trading: Final Rule, supra note 160; supra 
Sections II.A.1–2. 
 166 See supra note 14.  
 167 See infra Part V. 
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a robust knowledge base on which policymakers, courts, scholars, and 
others can rely. 
The study’s second aim was to compare general public impressions 
about, and attitudes toward, insider trading in 2019 with those 
expressed in the famous pair of 1986 Business Week surveys.168  Much 
has changed over the last several decades, including vast technological 
improvements, shifts in political views and demographics, and 
fluctuations in general understanding of and participation in equities 
markets.169  Although valuable, the Business Week surveys were short 
and relatively simple.170 
This Part first discusses the study’s strategy for optimizing, within 
its constraints, the survey’s effectiveness in gathering the relevant data.  
It then describes the methodology used to collect that information.  It 
concludes by noting the survey’s limitations. 
A.  Survey Strategy 
The survey rested on two building blocks.  The first was a set of 
topics related to insider trading that would benefit from being informed 
by public opinion.  The second comprised insights gained from 
conversations with empiricists, surveying scholarship, and legal 
literature presenting the results of public surveys.171  These informed 
the task at hand and the development of baseline practices.  A 
professional polling firm then administered the survey to a 
 
 168 Business Week 12/86, supra note 14; Business Week 8/86, supra note 14. 
 169 See KATIE KOLCHIN, A CHART BOOK ON STOCK OWNERSHIP (2019); B. Ravikumar, How 
Has Stock Ownership Trended in the Past Few Decades?, FED. RES. BANK OF ST. LOUIS (Apr. 9, 
2018), https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2018/april/stock-ownership-
trended-past-few-decades. 
 170 The August and December surveys contained nine and eight questions.  See 
Business Week 12/86, supra note 14; Business Week 8/86, supra note 14. 
 171 E.g., STEPHEN B. HULLEY ET AL., DESIGNING CLINICAL RESEARCH (4th ed. 2013); Courtney 
Megan Cahill & Geoffrey Christopher Rapp, Does the Public Care How the Supreme Court 
Reasons? Empirical Evidence from a National Experiment and Normative Concerns in the 
Case of Same-Sex Marriage, 93 N.C. L. REV. 303 (2015); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Assessing the Empirical Upside of Personalized Criminal Procedure, 86 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 489 (2019); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth 
Amendment Scrutiny, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747 (2017); Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth Amendment Doctrine, and the Mosaic 
Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205; Lior Strahilevitz & Omri Ben-Shahar, Interpreting 
Contracts via Surveys and Experiments, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1753 (2017). 
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census-representative group of 1,313 respondents in April 2019.172  
With this sample size, the survey-level margin of error is ±3 percent.173  
Census representativeness—across age, gender, race, and other 
categories—was important because insider trading law and policy is set 
almost entirely at the national level.174  More than half of the nation’s 
population175 invests in equities, directly or indirectly.176  Ownership 
spans all income groups.177  And in today’s enforcement climate, it is 
relatively easy for the unknowing—professionals and investing 
individuals alike—to be caught up in an insider trading investigation.178 
The survey, in other words, had to be temporally and historically 
relevant.  Practical considerations, however, limited what could be 
accomplished in one instrument.  If the survey was too long or too 
involved, respondents might abandon or be overwhelmed by it; 
therefore, content had to be limited.  It was important to obtain updated 
figures on the key questions from the 1986 Business Week surveys about 
the pervasiveness of insider trading, whether the practice should be 
illegal, and whether respondents would trade on a tip.179 
 
 
 172 These 1,313 respondents passed screening criteria to ensure that they were 
taking the study seriously.  See infra note 198.  The actual number of respondents was 
higher. 
 173 See infra note 209 and accompanying text; text accompanying notes 207–08.  
 174 States also have IT laws.  E.g., Cal. Corp. Code § 25402 (Deering 2020); N.Y. Gen. 
Bus. Law § 352-c (Consol. 2020); Vt. Stat. Ann. 9, § 4301 et seq. (2020); see also People 
v. Napolitano, 282 A.D.2d 49 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001) (affirming an insider trading 
conviction based on N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 352-c).  Nevertheless, the Securities Exchange 
Commission and Department of Justice are the usual plaintiffs in insider trading actions. 
 175 The survey included both citizens and noncitizens. 
 176 GARY MOTTOLA, INSIGHTS: FINANCIAL CAPABILITY: A SNAPSHOT OF INVESTOR HOUSEHOLDS IN 
AMERICA 1 (2015) (“Approximately 6 in 10 households”); Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Changes in U.S. Family Finances from 2013 to 2016: Evidence 
from the Survey of Consumer Finances 103 FED. RES. BULL. 20–21 (Sept. 2019) (“51.9 
percent of families”); Jeffrey M. Jones, U.S. Stock Ownership Down Among All but Older, 
Higher-Income, GALLUP (May 24, 2017), https://news.gallup.com/poll/211052/stock-
ownership-down-among-older-higher-income.aspx. 
 177 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, supra note 176, at 20. 
 178 See, e.g., Thomas A. Firey, Why Is Insider Trading Illegal?, CATO INST. (May 15, 2017, 
11:28 AM), https://www.cato.org/blog/why-insider-trading-illegal (former baseball 
player).  Joe Gyan Jr., Ruston Dentist Acquitted of Insider Trading Related to Sale of Shaw 
Group in Baton Rouge, ADVOCATE (Aug. 10, 2017, 4:15 PM), https://www.the
advocate.com/baton_rouge/news/business/article_823c64dc-7c8b-11e7-a307-
73dcfa0f6461.html (dentist).  Even an acquittal is devastating.  William Alden, F.B.I. Raid 
Was Blamed for the Demise of Two Hedge Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2014, at B2; William 
D. Cohan, Overturned, FORTUNE, Sept. 1, 2016, at 90. 
 179 See Business Week 12/86, supra note 14 at 34; Business Week 8/86, supra note 14 
at 74. 
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The survey had to cover the basic propositions and theories set out 
by various players in the insider trading debate, like the fiduciary-duty-
based theories and approaches applied in controlling case law, 
justifications for the competing parity-of-information and equal-access 
models, the market-confidence theory, questions of morality, questions 
of criminality, and other controversies discussed in Part II.  Both 
absolute and relative measures—like whether one of the basic theories 
of insider trading liability (classical or misappropriation) was regarded 
as more just, or whether respondents fair-punishment views changed 
when considering them in the abstract versus applied to 
themselves—were important. 
The resulting data had to be “deep as well as broad”180 so that it 
would provide an objective basis for characterizing public opinion 
across many dimensions.  It was important to know, for example, 
whether the public believed that insider trading, in the abstract, was 
immoral and, separately, should be illegal.181  To robustly test various 
theories, it was equally important to learn morality and legality views 
about insider trading in its various forms and under various 
circumstances. 
There was further benefit to approaching the individual points of 
inquiry from multiple angles.  Multiple questions, and juxtapositions of 
questions, tested the examined propositions.  Testing individual 
theories and propositions this way provided internal cross-checks and 
allowed for more conclusions to be drawn with increased confidence. 
This style of questioning yielded insight into how well-formed and 
strongly held public opinions were on these subjects.  Juxtaposing 
answers to each of two questions about the morality and legality of 
insider trading, for example, revealed information that illumined how 
strongly individuals held the beliefs that they expressed directly in 
answer to each of the questions.182  Comparing respondents’ answers 
about general punishment for insider trading versus what it should be 
for themselves if they were caught could yield insight on how 
 
 180 Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of 
the Right to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1433 (2018). 
 181 There is an ongoing debate, engaged in most famously by H.L.A. Hart and Patrick 
Devlin, about whether all that is immoral should be criminally punished.  Compare H.L.A. 
HART, LAW LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963) (arguing that morals should not be enforced via 
legal sanction), with PATRICK DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1959) (arguing the 
opposite); see Peter Cane, Taking Law Seriously: Starting Points for the Hart/Devlin 
Debate, 10 J. ETHICS 21 (2006) (describing the Hart-Devlin debate); supra text 
accompanying note 59 (“not every instance of financial unfairness constitutes 
fraudulent activity under § 10(b)”). 
 182 See infra Section IV.D.2. 
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well-considered respondents’ initial punishment views were.183  
Similarly, having respondents face related follow-up questions after 
having been exposed to various policy arguments (for, neutral, and 
against)—unceremoniously dubbed “propaganda” herein—regarding 
insider trading could reveal the extent to which opinions are subject to 
outside influences.184 
Although public opinion should not be the sole factor informing 
reform efforts, it should be a substantial part of that inquiry, particularly 
in the insider trading context.185  As Professors Green and Kugler point 
out, a disjunction between social views about a behavior’s propriety and 
the criminal law’s treatment of it causes the law to seem unfair, and 
ultimately lose credibility and effectiveness.186  Similarly, because law 
tends to shape and inform social norms,187 punishing too broadly also 
threatens the regime’s legitimacy.188  Indeed, if one believes that 
fairness is simply a function of social views, one might say that a law is 
unfair if it is misaligned with public attitudes.189  This effect “increases 
substantially” “when it is not intuitive that certain criminalized conduct 
is wrong.”190 
Professor John F. Stinneford shows that the common law is thought 
to reflect longstanding propositions enjoying universal acceptance, and 
thus reason, while externally imposed sovereign commands were 
suspect.191  The common law is also widely, albeit not universally, 
believed to produce more efficient—including more predictable—
results.192  The longstanding disjunction between the common law of, 
 
 183 See infra Section IV.D.3. 
 184 See infra Section IV.E. 
 185 See supra Section II.B.3; cf. 6 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 
§ 32:195 (5th ed. 2020) (noting, in the trademark context, that “[w]hile the courts are 
careful in writing opinions not to place all their evidentiary eggs in the survey basket, 
starting in last two decades of the 20th Century, an increasing number of judicial 
opinions expressly rely upon survey evidence to substantiate the decision”) 
 186 Green & Kugler, supra note 14, at 450–51 (citing sources). 
 187 See RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWER OF LAW (2015). 
 188 See Green & Kugler, supra note 14, at 451. 
 189 Cf. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; John F. Stinneford; The Original Meaning of “Cruel”, 105 
GEO. L.J. 441, 470 (2017) (noting that the Eighth Amendment intended to bar 
punishments misaligned with “universal, longstanding custom”). 
 190 Green & Kugler, supra note 14, at 451. 
 191 John F. Stinneford, The Original Meaning of “Unusual”: The Eighth Amendment as a 
Bar to Cruel Innovation, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1739, 1772–87 (2008).  “Reason,” here, refers 
to an amalgamation of concepts like common sense and natural law.  Id. at 1772, 1772 
n.193, 1773, 1773 n.202, 1773 n.203.  They can be summarized as “universal, abstract 
principles of justice.”  Id. at 1774. 
 192 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 249, 251 (7th ed. 2007); Frank B. 
Cross, Identifying the Virtues of the Common Law, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 21, 21–22 (2007) 
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and regulatory behavior toward, insider trading was, therefore, worthy 
of examination.193 
This Article’s goals are primarily descriptive.  It offers some 
analysis, but only to enhance the study’s descriptive strength.  Although 
it is tempting to draw why conclusions at this stage, that would be 
premature because this survey illuminates the topics about which 
detailed why questions should be asked.194 
B.  Survey Design and Administration 
The survey was administered online using written instructions.195  
Online administration allowed for a substantially larger sample size 
given a fixed budget, enhancing precision.196  Written surveys are 
typically more uniform and efficient, and “written information is more 
likely to be retained by research subjects.”197  
The survey was divided into three stages.  Stage 1 elicited opinions 
about insider trading directly.  Stage 2 asked participants to imagine 
themselves in the roles of individuals who had the opportunity to trade 
on material nonpublic information in various situations.  Some 
respondents were asked whether trading in those roles would be 
ethical.  Others were asked whether they would, in fact, trade if they 
found themselves in the described situations.  The survey included two 
 
(citing sources); id. at 24–41 (discussing theories for the common law’s alleged 
superiority over legislative and administrative lawmaking); Paul H. Rubin, Why Is the 
Common Law Efficient?, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977); Jeffery Evans Stake, Evolution of Rules 
in a Common Law System: Differential Litigation of the Fee Tail and Other Perpetuities, 32 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 401, 401–02 (2005) (citing a comprehensive array of sources and 
noting that in the common law “there is a feedback loop, a mechanism that returns the 
output of a system back to the system’s input, that provides courts with opportunities 
to overturn inefficient common law . . . rules”); id. at 404–10 (describing common law 
mechanisms and processes that favor efficient results).  Professor Cross empirically 
compares the common and civil law, finding that the former is superior in some areas, 
like predictability, but finding no difference in others.  See Cross, supra, at 46–57. 
 193 See supra text accompanying note 126. 
 194 This is planned for upcoming work.  See infra Section V. 
 195 The survey script, available in full in Appendix A, available at http://dx.doi.org/
10.15786/20.500.11919/7122, was crafted into an online survey using Qualtrics.  
Respondent selection was designed to achieve a census-representative sample by 
Dynata, a reputable provider of first-party survey and research data.  See Our Company, 
DYNATA, https://www.dynata.com/company/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2021); About Dynata, 
DYNATA, https://www.dynata.com/company/about-us/ (last visited Jan. 2, 2021).   
 196 See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
 197 Kugler & Strahilevitz, supra note 171, at 497–98 (citing a study of Miranda 
warnings); see HULLEY ET AL., supra note 171, at 232; see also DIANE L. SCHALLERT ET AL., 
ANALYSES OF DIFFERENCES BETWEEN WRITTEN AND ORAL LANGUAGE 6 (University of Illinois at 
Urbana-Champaign, Technical Report No. 29, Apr. 1977) (“Readers can sample the text 
in the most efficient way for their purposes, while listeners must follow the material as 
the speaker presents it . . . .”).  
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screening questions asking respondents to enter specified text; answers 
of respondents who did not enter the specified text were excluded from 
the data set.198  Answering any given question was optional.  Stage 3 
asked for demographic information. 
Stages 1 and 2 are detailed in the next two subsections.  Section II.C 
discusses the survey’s key limitations.  Part IV presents and discusses 
the survey’s findings. 
1.  Stage 1: Direct Assessment of Insider Trading Views 
Stage 1 asked participants a basic set of direct questions about 
their general attitudes about insider trading.  Most of these questions 
were objective, presenting respondents with two to four answer 
choices.  Participants were asked eight to ten objective questions, with 
two of the questions asked, or not, depending on respondents’ answers 
to previous questions.199  Answers to these questions did not have to be 
coded; they were used as-is. 
  
 
 198 Appendix A, at 3, 6, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15786/20.500.11919/7122.  
The two screening questions were included (1) between Stages 1 and 2, and (2) before 
the propaganda section in Stage 2, to determine whether respondents were reading 
questions and answering them to the best of their abilities, or merely selecting random 
answers to get to the end of the survey.  Because survey respondents were compensated, 
this additional step was added to minimize the number of respondents who would click 
through the questions quickly simply to receive payment.  See infra Section IV.E.2. 
 199 The survey is available in full in Appendix A, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.157
86/20.500.11919/7122.  The objective questions are paraphrased here: 
Q1 How common is insider trading? 
Q2 Do you personally invest in stocks? 
Q3 What might keep you from investing? 
Q3.a Would insider trading in a stock you like make 
you more, less, or equally likely to buy it? 
Q4 Would insider trading in the market prevent 
you from investing in it? 
Q5 Would you trade on inside information? 
Q6 Is insider trading morally wrong? 
Q7 Should insider trading be illegal? 
Q7.a How should inside traders be punished? 
Q7.b How should you be punished for inside trading? 
Questions 1, 2, 3, 3.a, 4, 5, 6, and 7 were objective and posed to all participants.  
Questions 7.a and 7.b were objective and posed to only those participants who answered 
Question 7 in the affirmative. 
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Respondents were also asked one or two of four possible 
open-ended questions, and the total again depended on the answers to 
previous questions.200  Answers to these questions were coded by a law 
student research assistant whom one of the Authors trained.  The coding 
was straightforward enough that a student could be trusted with it.  A 
spot-check revealed that the work was accurate.  Student coding also 
minimized the likelihood that subconscious author bias would impact 
the results.201  In any event, the survey’s results are less prone to 
subjective biases because only a small proportion of its responses 
required coding. 
Stage 1 was followed by a screening question,202 and then Stage 2, 
discussed below. 
2.  Stage 2: Scenario-Based Assessment of Insider Trading 
Views 
Stage 2 employed scenario-based, role-playing questions to 
indirectly elicit participants’ attitudes toward insider trading in various 
situations.  The objective scenarios were coupled with short 
propaganda narratives about alleged benefits or harms of insider 
trading.  The Stage’s goals were twofold.  First, it aimed to determine 
public instincts about insider trading in situations implying fiduciary or 
other relational duties.  Second, it sought to ascertain the malleability of 
respondents’ sentiments about insider trading. 
Upon entering Stage 2, participants were channeled into one of two 
tracks: ethical or pragmatic.  Respondents were then presented with a 
series of five scenarios related to the purchase of a small corporation by 
 
 200 The open-ended questions are paraphrased here: 
Q3.b One of Q3.b.1–3 based on answer to Q3.a 
Q3.b.1 [more likely] Why? 
Q3.b.2 [less likely] What about insider trading would 
make you less likely? 
Q3.b.3 [equally likely] Would any amount of insider 
trading change your mind? 
Q5.a [if Q5 answered No]   
What factors would stop you? 
Question 5.a was asked only to participants who answered Question 7 in the negative.  
The actual answers to the open-ended questions are available in Appendix B. 
 201 Mark A. Hall & Ronald F. Wright, Systematic Content Analysis of Judicial Opinions, 
96 CALIF. L. REV. 63, 111 (2008) (stating, in the context of coding judicial opinions, that 
“[f]rom a social science perspective, [scholar, as opposed to student, coding] is the height 
of unmitigated subjectivism—the opposite of good scholarship”).  Much of Hall & 
Wright’s article, especially Part IV, is a catalog of best practices for performing case 
coding.  Many of its recommendations apply to a broad range of empirical studies. 
 202 See supra note 198 and accompanying text. 
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a larger one.  The survey asked participants to imagine themselves in 
five roles connected to the small firm in which they were exposed to 
profitable material nonpublic information.  In the ethical cohort, for 
each role, participants were asked whether it would be ethical to buy, 
first, the small target firm’s stock and, second, the large acquiring firm’s 
stock.  Participants in the pragmatic track were asked whether they 
actually would buy in the given situation. 
In the first scenario, participants were asked to imagine themselves 
as the CEO—the archetypical insider—of the small firm.  From there, 
they were asked to step into the shoes of, in turn, a janitorial employee 
of the firm, an outside accountant hired to audit the firm, the friend of a 
middle manager of the firm at a holiday party, and a quasi-stranger who 
encountered a brokerage-firm-employee neighbor in an elevator.  Half 
of each track was presented with the scenarios in reverse order to reveal 
whether question order influenced responses. 
Each track was further divided into two groups.  Half of the ethical 
track was told, in conjunction with assuming the role of CEO of the small 
firm, that the firm had expressly granted permission to insiders in their 
positions to trade on firm information.  Half of the pragmatic track was 
asked whether they would trade on the information presented to them 
in each scenario knowing that they could do so “without getting caught.” 
After respondents passed through all five scenarios, they were 
randomly selected to hear and read203 a piece of text expounding one of 
three propaganda statements regarding insider trading.  One exposition 
presented the traditional fairness view of insider trading, explaining 
how it is unfair and detrimental to markets.  Another was neutral, 
asserting that insider trading likely had no meaningful impact.  A third 
presented a positive view of insider trading, explaining how it could 
benefit individual investors and markets.  Equal proportions of 
participants were presented with each exposition. 
After listening to and reading the text, respondents were again 
asked to imagine themselves in situations that were designed to be 
substantively analogous to the original own-company scenarios that 
 
 203 Although written questionnaires tend to be superior to interviews, see supra note 
197 and accompanying text, “[c]ognitive research has established the fact that humans 
process information by means of two distinct channels—one for visuospatial 
information and one for auditory-verbal information.  A given piece of information can 
be organized and ‘stored’ in memory in either or both of these representational systems.  
According to dual-coding theory, information that is represented in both formats is 
more likely to be recalled than information that is stored in either format alone.”  Diane 
F. Halpern & Milton D. Hakel, Applying the Science of Learning to the University and 
Beyond: Teaching for Long-Term Retention and Transfer, CHANGE, July/Aug. 2003, at 39. 
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they already faced.204  Participants were randomly selected to respond 
to three of the five follow-up scenarios.  Integrity of the cohorts was 
maintained: those in the pragmatic cohort were asked pragmatic 
follow-up questions, and those in the ethical cohort were asked ethical 
follow-up questions.  The follow-up questions maintained the language 
respondents initially faced regarding getting caught or having 
permission that the respondents initially faced. 
The flowchart in Figure 1 illustrates the paths respondents took 
through Stage 2 of the survey.  The next Section discusses some of the 
survey’s limitations.  Part IV presents the results. 
  
 
 204 The analog to the original CEO scenario was another CEO scenario involving a 
successful product.  The analog to the original janitor scenario was one involving a 
security guard.  The analog to the original accountant scenario was another accountant 
scenario in the ethical path, but a scenario involving a junior attorney in the pragmatic 
path.  The analog to the holiday party was a dinner with the insider friend.  The analog 
to the quasi-stranger in the elevator was the same quasi-stranger at an adjacent lane in 
a bowling alley.  
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C.  Limitations 
Surveys are, unavoidably, proxies for perfect knowledge about 
what respondents think.  Surveys cannot read minds.  Their informative 
value comes from (1) collecting many answers to maximize the 
probability that participants’ answers reflect what they actually think205 
and (2) providing a knowledge base that can be used to intuit additional 
information.206  Few claims can truly be proven or falsified.  This Section 
sets forth some of this survey’s particular limitations. 
1.  Sampling Error 
As with any nonuniversal analysis, the results are subject to 
sampling error.  Sampling error is “the possibility that the sample being 
tested is not representative of the population from which it is randomly 
drawn.”207  Increasing sample size reduces the magnitude of sampling 
error.208  The survey’s sample size of 1,313 produced a margin of error 
of ±3%.209  In subgroups, which have lower numbers of respondents, the 
margin of error is higher.  The observed results are, nevertheless, the 
best estimates of the actual values.210 
2.  Respondent Background Knowledge 
It is difficult to know respondents’ background knowledge and 
what they assumed about survey questions based on that knowledge.  
For example, it cannot be precisely known whether, when asked about 
investing in the “stock market,” respondents considered holding 
equities in a retirement account or investing in mutual funds to be 
 
 205 See supra note 172 accompanying text. 
 206 See supra text accompanying notes 182–84; infra Sections IV.D.2–3, IV.E. 
 207 George A. Mocsary, Statistically Insignificant Deaths: Disclosing Drug Harms to 
Investors (and Patients) Under SEC Rule 10b-5, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 111, 155 (2013); see 
David H. Kaye, David A. Freedman & David H. Kaye, Reference Guide on Statistics, in FED. 
JUD. CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCI. EVIDENCE 211, 296 (3d ed. 2011) (“[T]he estimate is 
likely to differ from the population value because the sample is not a perfect microcosm 
of the whole.”). 
 208 Freedman & Kaye, supra note 207, at 246. 
 209 “Margin of error” is a technical term denoting the range of values lying within a 
given “confidence interval” around the observed value.  RICHARD D. DE VEAUX ET AL., INTRO 
STATS 489–92 (3d ed. 2009).  For a given sample size, a confidence interval of a certain 
percentage denotes the percentage of samples taken from the population that will 
capture the true value.  Id. at 489.  This study employed the customary confidence 
interval of 95% to calculate margins of error.  See id. at 490–91.  A ±3% margin of error, 
therefore, means that one can be 95% certain that the true proportion of the population 
that would answer a survey question a certain way is within 3% of the stated number.  
See id. at 489–91.  The 1,313 does not include respondents who were disqualified for 
incorrectly answering two screening questions.  See supra note 198. 
 210 See Mocsary, supra note 207, at 128 n.90. 
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investing.211  Although tradeoffs between survey length212 are 
ever-present, it is often possible, as in this case, to glean indirect insight 
into facts that could not be discerned directly.213 
The nuances of insider trading and its interaction with trading 
markets are complex and technical.214  A layperson may not have an 
independent basis on which to form opinions about insider trading’s 
pervasiveness, economic effects, and the like.215  It is possible, therefore, 
“that this is an area in which the median voter has delegated her feelings 
on the matter to her elected officials and to administrative specialists 
such as SEC investigators.”216 
Relatedly, what participants said may not reflect what they 
thought.  It cannot be known for certain whether the respondents meant 
what they said or said what they meant.  There is evidence in the results 
of Stage 2, for example, that some respondents were applying moral 
judgments while engaging with the pragmatic scenarios.217 
But in some situations, like measuring the effect of propaganda 
herein, the amalgamation of respondents’ “priors”218 merely presents a 
baseline against which effects can be measured.  Even if respondents’ 
biases influenced their initial answers in Stage 2, it is possible to test the 
effects of propaganda on those views by directly comparing a 
participant’s pre- and post-propaganda answers.219  Indeed, this 
limitation is at least a partial strength because one of the survey’s goals 
was to assess the effect of outside influence on public opinions about 
insider trading.220 
 
 211 See Business Week 12/86, supra note 14, at 34; Business Week 8/86, supra note 14, 
at 74.  
 212 See supra text between notes 178 and 179.  
 213 See infra note 262 and accompanying text (offering a possible reason why 
answers were different to separate questions asking about reactions to insider trading 
in individual stocks and the market); infra Sections IV.D.2, IV.D.3, IV.E.1 (discussing 
findings inferred from direct survey answers).  
 214 Jeffrey Wagner, Wagner Comments on Kidd et al. SEA 2019 (Nov. 23, 2019) 
(unpublished conference paper) (on file with authors).  
 215 See id. 
 216 Id. 
 217 See infra Section IV.E.1.ii. 
 218 “Prior” is short for the statistical terms, “prior knowledge” and “prior probability.”  
See Mocsary, supra note 207, at 140 n.165, 153–54.  It represents the amalgamation of 
an individual’s beliefs and experiences that inform the individual’s assessment of the 
probability of a given event happening.  See id.  More colloquially, the term refers to the 
beliefs and preconceptions that one brings to a situation. 
 219 See infra Section IV.E.2. 
 220 See supra Section III.B.2. 
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3.  Respondent Understanding and Question Interpretation 
It can be difficult to tell whether any respondents had trouble 
understanding the survey.  For example, in a nationally representative 
sample, some respondents may have experienced a language barrier.  
One clue that some respondents did not fully understand some 
questions is that they provided answers that were not directly 
responsive but nonetheless related to the subject matter.  For example, 
in response to the question, “If you had done your research and found a 
company that you liked and wanted to invest in, is there anything that 
might keep you from buying stock in that company?” some participants 
entered the name of a specific company.221  One respondent, who 
indicated that insider trading in a company’s stock would make no 
difference to his or her likelihood of buying that stock, frankly replied, 
“I do not know anything about any of this. I am so sorry,” to a follow-up 
question asking whether any amount of insider trading would change 
his or her mind. 
But such answers were rare enough that their effects were likely 
trivialized by the study’s large sample size.222  In addition, because 
measuring the malleability of the public’s views about insider trading 
was an important objective, the survey attempted to partially mitigate 
respondent misunderstanding of the arguments for and against insider 
trading by adding a professionally read and recorded audio clip of the 
arguments to the survey’s written text.223 
Even in the absence of misunderstanding, participants may have 
interpreted questions differently.  Without asking overly detailed 
questions that may have been difficult for some respondents to 
understand, it is impossible to know whether respondents perceived 
absolute or relative increases in the pervasiveness of insider trading as 
 
 221 Appendix A, at 1, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15786/20.500.11919/7122.  
For example, Apple, Google, Facebook, and Morgan Stanley.  Although rare, some 
questions had stranger answers.  For example, respondents indicating that they would 
be less willing to buy a company’s stock if insiders were trading in it were asked, “[w]hat 
is it about insider trading that would make you less willing to buy?”  Three respondents 
answered, “[p]ersonal information,” “[a] small locally owned company nothing a large 
national company the too many finger to get an equal slice,” and “my privacy being 
stolen.” 
  Some answers, however, suggested that respondents were thinking more deeply 
about a question.  For example, when asked why they would be more likely to trade in a 
firm’s stock in the presence of insider trading, two participants responded, “my 
children” and “[t]his game can be beat up.”  The responses suggest that these 
participants believed that insider trading in the stock would somehow benefit them 
financially and that they would trade for the benefit of their children or themselves.  
 222 See supra text accompanying notes 172–73; note 209 and accompanying text. 
 223 See supra note 203 and accompanying text. 
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compared to perceptions in 1986.224  If the latter, it cannot be known 
along which measure—market size, economy size, population, 
etc.—respondents were mentally comparing insider trading 
frequencies.  More simply, and of meaningful research value, the belief 
that insider trading is more common today may be a result of greater 
exposure to public chatter about the topic.225 
4.  Results Interpretation 
Although employing objective questions can reduce the potential 
for researcher subjectivity to skew results, it does not entirely eliminate 
interpretational uncertainty.226  The same can be said of employing law 
students to code subjective questions.227  Although “there is good reason 
to believe that law students are capable of accurately coding a wide 
range of variables,”228 student coders may lack the expertise necessary 
reliably to code more nuanced responses.229 
Interpreting objective questions is open to some subjectivity when 
analyzing results beyond reporting the hard data.  This includes how to 
interpret nonresponsive answers and nonanswers.230  The next Part, 
therefore, while presenting the survey’s key findings, offers only 
educated speculation on why certain answers were given, leaving a 
detailed examination of that topic for a future work.231 
IV.  PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD INSIDER TRADING 
This Part begins with a comparison of this survey’s results with the 
famous pair of 1986 Business Week studies in Section A.  It then 
summarizes the survey’s findings across four broad dimensions.  
Section B discusses results speaking to the public’s views about insider 
trading’s pervasiveness.  Section C covers the survey’s implications 
about the effect of insider trading on market confidence.  Section D 
 
 224 See Wagner, supra note 214; infra Table 1. 
 225 Research on the availability heuristic shows that decision-makers tend to assign 
heightened probabilities to the occurrence of events that they have heard about more 
recently and frequently.  Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A Heuristic for 
Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207, 230 (1973). 
 226 See supra Sections III.B.1, III.B.2.  
 227 See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 228 Ruben & Blocher, supra note 180, at 1464 (citing Charles A. Johnson, 
Content-Analytic Techniques and Judicial Research, 15 AM. POL. Q. 169, 182–96 (1987)).  
 229 Hall & Wright, supra note 201, at 111. 
 230 NONRESPONSE IN SOCIAL SCIENCE SURVEYS: A RESEARCH AGENDA (Roger Tourngeau & 
Thomas J. Plewes eds., 2013). 
 231 The Authors intend to survey and flesh out the why in an upcoming article.  See 
infra Part V.  Indeed, this survey informs the topics about which why questions should 
be asked.  See supra text accompanying note 147. 
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reports respondents’ stated views about the morality of, and 
appropriate punishment for, insider trading.  It couples this descriptive 
account with analyses of individual respondents’ answers to offer 
deeper insight into the strength of the expressed views.  Section E 
describes participants’ expressed views about the propriety of insider 
trading in various situations, and the effect on those views of exposing 
respondents to various items of insider trading propaganda.  
The survey aimed to achieve a census-representative sample 
across gender,232 race,233 age, education, income,234 and citizenship.  It 
also captured views by political ideology and trading status.  There were 
no significant differences in views across the mainstream political 
spectrum.  The results suggest that insider trading is simply not a 
political issue.235 
Each Section relates the key findings at the survey level and notes 
stand-out findings at the demographic-cohort level.  The survey, its raw 
data, summary spreadsheets, and a readme file are available online at 
Mountain Scholar with a unique Digital Object Identifier.236 
 
 232 Participants were given the option to identify as a gender other than male or 
female.  Three respondents so identified, which was insufficient to draw meaningful 
conclusions. 
 233 The broad racial categories employed by the survey were adapted from the U.S. 
Census.  They are standard among survey instruments.  By their nature as broad 
categories, they are poor representations of the actual lived experiences of respondents.  
Little can or should be assumed about individual participants based on the various 
socioeconomic groups—racial or otherwise—with which they most strongly identified. 
The number of respondents identifying as Native American (13) or Other (22) was 
small, reducing those results’ reliability. 
 234 Categories for age, education, and income were standard survey categories.  Age 
categories were: 18–24; 25–34; 35–44; 45–54; 55–64; 65–74; and 75+.  Education 
categories were: None; Some High School; High School Diploma or GED; Some College; 
Technical or Vocational Degree; Associates Degree; Bachelor’s Degree; Master’s Degree; 
Professional Degree; and Doctoral Degree.  Income categories were less than $25,000; 
$25,000–$34,999; $35,000–$49,999; $50,000–$74,999; $75,000–$99,999; $100,000–
$149,999; $150,000–$199,999; and more than $200,000. 
 235 This result held throughout the survey, with the only significant difference 
between ideological categories arising among participants identifying as socialist, 
communist, or libertarian.  There was no significant difference between the remaining 
categories (very conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, and very liberal), 
indicating that insider trading views are not ideology driven.  Further, the number of 
respondents identifying as socialist (21), communist (11), or libertarian (17) was small, 
reducing those results’ reliability. 
 236 John P. Anderson, Jeremy L. Kidd & George A. Mocsary, Public Perceptions of 
Insider Trading, MOUNTAIN SCHOLAR (2020), http://dx.doi.org/10.15786/
20.500.11919/7122.  
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A.  Comparisons to 1986 
Given the social, political, financial, and technological changes since 
the famous Business Week surveys of August and December 1986,237 it 
is valuable, as a threshold matter, comparing those surveys’ results to 
those obtained in this study.  The surveys overlapped on the three key 
points, shown in Table 1, which are referenced throughout this Article.  
Table 1: Comparisons to 1986238 
 8/86 12/86 4/19 
Insider trading is common or very common 63% 67% 80% 
Insider trading should be illegal 52% 66% 66% 
Would trade on a tip 53% 55% 45% 
 
The August 1986 results were collected before the SEC announced 
its famous enforcement action against Ivan Boesky,239 and the 
December 1986 results after that.240  Although insider trading actions 
were relatively rare before 1986, the number of civil and criminal 
actions has since increased markedly,241 with a corresponding increase 
in public discussion of the topic. 
B.  Pervasiveness 
The public believes that insider trading is more pervasive 
compared to 1986.  After the Boesky scandal, 67 percent of respondents 
believed that it was common, whereas in 2019, 80 percent believed that 
it was common or very common.242  Table 2 shows overall opinions 
 
 237 See supra text accompanying notes 168–69; Ravikumar, supra note 169; Business 
Week 12/86, supra note 14; Business Week 8/86, supra note 14.   
 238 The questions have been paraphrased.  See Business Week 8/86, supra note 14, 
at 74, Business Week 12/86, supra note 14, at 34, and Appendix A, 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15786/20.500.11919/7122, for the questions as 
administered.  The 1961 Harvard Business Review study asking executives whether 
they would trade on information obtained at a board meeting reported that 42 percent 
responded that they would, 14 percent would have told a friend, 2 percent would have 
told a broker, and 56 percent would have done nothing.  See Baumhart, supra note 14, 
at 16. 
 239 Stephen R. Martin, Ivan Boesky: American Banker, ENCYC. BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/biography/Ivan-Boesky (last visited Jan. 31, 2021). 
 240 See generally James B. Stewart & Daniel Hertzberg, Spreading Scandal: Fall of Ivan 
F. Boesky Leads to Broader Probe of Insider Information, WALL ST. J., Nov. 17, 1986, at 1. 
 241 See Stephen J. Crimmins, Insider Trading: Where is the Line?, 2013 COLUM. BUS. L. 
REV. 330, 349 (2013). 
 242 See supra Table 1.  The December 1986 survey reported the percentage of 
respondents expressing the belief that insider trading was “Common.”  Business Week 
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about the pervasiveness of insider trading at the survey level, and those 
broken down by gender, race, and trading status. 
Table 2: Answers to “How common do you think insider trading is?” 
 Very Common Common Rare Very Rare 
Overall 25.4% 55.0% 15.0% 4.6% 
Gender 
   Female 24.0% 57.0% 14.4% 4.5% 
   Male 26.8% 52.7% 15.9% 4.6% 
Race 
   Asian 25.8% 51.5% 18.2% 4.5% 
   Black 41.6% 38.8% 15.2% 4.5% 
   Latinx 25.3% 55.4% 14.5% 4.8% 
   Native Am. 25.0% 58.3% 0.0% 16.7% 
   White 22.3% 58.3% 15.1% 4.3% 
   Other 22.7% 54.6% 13.6% 9.1% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 30.5% 52.1% 14.4% 3.0% 
   Abstain 21.5% 56.9% 15.9% 5.7% 
 
The data revealed that general opinions regarding insider trading’s 
pervasiveness—the sum of “common” and “very common” 
responses—were likely more relevant than participants’ attempts to 
distinguish between “common” and “very common” or between “rare” 
and “very rare.”  Men were slightly more likely to say insider trading is 
very common, for example, but there were no significant differences 
between genders when “common” and “very common” answers were 
combined.  Similarly, Black respondents were more likely to answer that 
insider trading is “very common” but did not differ significantly in their 
overall views of its pervasiveness. 
Investors were more likely than abstainers to view insider trading 
as pervasive.  If insider trading’s perceived pervasiveness undermines 
market confidence, one would expect that those who invest would be 
 
12/86, supra note 14, at 34.  The August 1986 survey reported the percentage of 
respondents expressing the belief that insider trading was “Very or somewhat 
common.”  Business Week 8/86, supra note 14, at 74. 
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less likely to believe that insider trading is common or very common.  
Slight trends emerged based on age, income, and educational 
attainment: older, wealthier, and more educated participants were less 
likely to view insider trading as pervasive.  
C.  Market Confidence 
Data on public perceptions of insider trading’s frequency are, 
perhaps, less useful than on whether those perceptions translate into 
reluctance to trade, as the market-confidence theory predicts.243  The 
results are mixed. 
54.3 percent of respondents said that they do not invest in the stock 
market, which is a significant decrease from the 80.4 percent who 
believed that insider trading is common or very common, suggesting 
that insider trading does not deter a large portion of would-be investors 
from market participation.  Of the 25.4 percent of respondents who 
believed that insider trading was very common, 13.3 percent—over 
half—nonetheless invest.244  In a strong form of the market-confidence 
theory, the group answering that insider trading was very common 
should be the group least likely to invest in stocks.  Of the 55.0 percent 
of participants who believed that insider trading was common, 22.2 
percent245 nonetheless invest.  Overall, of the 80.4 percent believing that 
insider trading was common or very common, 35.5 percent—less than 
half246—invest; of the 19.6 percent who believe that insider trading is 
rare or very rare, 7.5 percent—significantly less than half247—invest. 
There was no trend in trading activity between age groups.  There 
were substantial differences between cohorts, with non-investors 
ranging from 47.6 percent for 65- to 74-year-olds, to 59.0 percent for 
those 75 or older, but no discernable pattern.  Further investigation 
might reveal some unseen correlation, such as market downturns 
during formative periods in the lives of individuals in cohorts where 
trading activity is low.  Market participation rose steadily with 
education and income, as might be expected. 
Some of the individuals who invest may do so reluctantly or to a 
lesser degree, preferring to invest excess income in what they believe to 
be a substandard market rather than forgo the higher returns that 
 
 243 See supra Section II.B.3. 
 244 That is, 52.1 percent of those who responded that insider trading was very 
common nevertheless invest. 
 245 That is, 40.4 percent. 
 246 44.1 percent, to be precise. 
 247 38.1 percent, to be precise. 
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equity markets nonetheless offer.248  This would support a less-robust 
form of the market-confidence theory.  The survey addressed, at least 
partially, this possibility in two ways.  First, it asked respondents, via an 
open-ended question, whether anything might keep them from 




 248 See infra notes 259–62 and accompanying text. 
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Table 3: Answers to “If you had done your research and found a company 
that you liked and wanted to invest in, is there anything that might keep 
you from buying stock in that company?”249 
No 30.6% 
Discomfort with this trade 21.1% 
   Company’s bad financial reputation 9.9% 
   Company’s bad moral/ethical reputation 5.6% 
   Company is a bad investment 2.8% 
   Company’s stock is unstable 1.4% 
   Other 1.1% 
   Insider trading at the company 0.4% 
Lack of capital to invest 11.3% 
Discomfort trading generally 7.5% 
   Investing is too risky 3.9% 
   Don’t trust financial markets  1.6% 
   Not interested in trading 0.9% 
   Don’t know how to trade 0.8% 
   Overall market trends 0.8% 
Don’t know 6.3% 
Yes 4.7% 
Trading is too costly (stock price, fees) 4.0% 
Advice from family, friends, or financial advisors 1.8% 
 
Notably, despite knowing that the study was about insider trading, 
only 0.4 percent indicated that insider trading in the company would 
deter them from investing in that company.  Six times as many 
individuals, when asked what about insider trading in the stock of a 
company that they were researching would make them less willing to 
buy, said that it was fear of being innocently caught up in a regulatory 
action.250  The chilling effect of insider trading enforcement may thus 
 
 249 12.8 percent of answers were blank or nonresponsive. 
 250 See infra Table 4, which shows that 48.2 percent of respondents would be less 
willing to buy stock in a company if they thought that a small number of people were 
trading in its stock based on inside information.  See also infra Table 5, which shows that 
4.9 percent of that 48.2 percent would be less willing to buy stock in that company for 
ANDERSON, KIDD & MOCSARY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2021  8:30 AM 
1080 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:1035 
have a greater impact on market participation than does the activity that 
it seeks to prevent. 
Second, participants were asked two separate questions directly 
positing the presence of insider trading and their willingness to trade.  
The first asked respondents whether they would be more or less willing 
to trade in a company’s stock if they believed that there was a small 
amount of insider trading in that stock.  The second asked participants 
whether they would be more or less willing to engage in trading in the 
stock market generally if they knew that insider trading was common in 
that same broad market.  Summary and outlier answers to both 
questions are presented in Table 4. 
  
 
fear that innocent investors might be implicated in a regulatory action.  (48.2)(0.049) = 
2.4 percent.  This 2.4 percent is six times as large as 0.4 percent.  This figure is slightly 
higher, because of rounding, than the actual value of 5.8 times as many, which is 
obtained by dividing the twenty-nine respondents who indicated fear of innocent 
implication by the five who would be deterred from investing by insider trading at a 
company of interest. 
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Table 4: Willingness to Trade in the Presence of Insider Trading 
“If you thought that a small number of people were trading on inside 
information concerning a company you have been researching, would it 
make you more likely to buy stock in that company, less likely, or make 
no difference?” 
 
 Less Likely No Difference More Likely 
Δ Less Likely vs. 
Market251 
Overall 48.2% 34.3% 17.5% +4.9% 
Gender 
   Female 46.6% 37.1% 16.3% +6.5% 
   Male 50.3% 31.4% 18.3% +3.4% 
Race 
   Asian 45.5% 28.8% 25.8% +1.5% 
   Black 37.1% 30.9% 32.0% +9.0% 
   Latinx 42.2% 37.4% 20.5% +2.4% 
   Native Am. 50.0% 16.7% 33.3% -16.7% 
   White 51.4% 35.0% 13.6% +4.9% 
   Other 40.9% 50.0% 9.1%% +4.6% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 50.3% 24.4% 25.3% +8.9% 




 251 This column represents the difference between (1) the percentage of 
respondents’ answering that they would be less likely to trade in a company’s stock if 
they knew that a small number of people were trading on it based on inside information, 
and (2) the percentage of respondents’ answering that they would be less likely to invest 
in the stock market if they knew that insider trading was common in that market. 
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“If you knew insider trading was common in the stock market, would you 
be more likely to invest, less likely, or would it make no difference?” 
 
 Less Likely No Difference More Likely 
Δ Less Likely vs. 
Company252 
Overall 43.3% 40.6% 14.9% -4.9% 
Gender 
   Female 40.2% 42.1% 16.7% -6.5% 
   Male 47.0% 39.3% 12.5% -3.4% 
Race 
   Asian 43.9% 36.4% 19.7% -1.5% 
   Black 28.1% 39.3% 32.6% -9.0% 
   Latinx 39.8% 34.9% 25.3% -2.4% 
   Native Am. 66.7% 33.3% 0.0% +16.7% 
   White 46.5% 41.7% 10.3% -4.9% 
   Other 36.4% 50.0% 9.1% -4.6% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 41.3% 38.4% 19.1% -8.9% 
   Abstain 44.5% 42.7% 11.5% -2.5% 
 
Overall, fewer than half of the survey’s participants said that they 
would be less likely to trade in a given stock if they believed that insider 
trading was occurring in that stock, and even fewer said that “common” 
insider trading in the broader stock market would deter them from 
trading.  51.8 percent responded that their awareness of limited insider 
trading (insider trading by a small number of people) in a stock of 
interest would either not affect their trading in that stock or make them 
more likely to invest in it.  Similarly, 55.5 percent responded that 
knowledge of common insider trading would either make them more 
likely to invest or make no difference.  This, again, offers limited support 
for the market-confidence theory, in that some of the 48.2 and 43.3 
percent of respondents who were less likely to invest in a stock of 
 
 252 This column represents the difference between (1) the percentage of 
respondents’ answering that they would be less likely to invest in the stock market if 
they knew that insider trading was common in that market and (2) the percentage of 
respondents’ answering that they would be less likely to trade in a company’s stock if 
they knew that a small number of people were trading on it based on inside information. 
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interest or the overall market, respectively, might also be abstaining 
altogether because of insider trading.253 
Men were slightly more likely to be concerned about insider 
trading than women in both scenarios.  White respondents were more 
likely to be concerned than all minorities in the company-specific 
scenario, and more than all but Native American participants in the 
broad-market scenario.  Black participants were least concerned with 
insider trading.  Their responses were most evenly split between less 
likely, indifferent, and more likely in the company-specific scenario, and 
they were least likely to avoid trading when insider trading is common 
in the broader market scenario.  
This directly expressed aversion254 to investing because of insider 
trading rises generally, though not uniformly, with age in both the 
company-specific and broad-market scenarios, as shown in Figure 2.  It 
may be the result of longer exposure to public chatter—including 
much-hyped prosecutions and convictions of figures like Ivan Boesky 
and Raj Rajaratnam—that influences views and induces fear.255 
  
 
 253 Accord supra notes 243–46 and accompanying text. 
 254 As compared to a discerned aversion.  See supra notes 243–46 and accompanying 
text. 
 255 See Elvis Picardo, How the SEC Tracks Insider Trading, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/021815/how-sec-tracks-insider-
trading.asp (last updated June 25, 2019); supra notes 239, 42 and accompanying text; 
see infra text accompanying note 271; see supra note 225 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of Respondents Less Likely to Invest Because of 
Insider Trading, by Age 
 
Expressed aversion to investing because of insider trading rises 
somewhat with income (Figure 3) and education (Figure 4) in the 
company-specific scenario, but those relationships weaken 
substantially or disappear when the concern is insider trading in the 




 256 The upward trends might be exaggerated by the Some High School category (with 
only forty-six respondents), which was an outlier on the low end. 
 257 See BOSHARA ET AL., THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF WEALTH: HOW AGE, EDUCATION AND RACE 
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Figure 3: Percentage of Respondents Less Willing to Invest Because of 
Insider Trading, by Income 
 
Figure 4: Percentage of Respondents Less Willing to Invest Because of 
Insider Trading, by Education 
 
Just over half of active traders would be less likely to trade in the 
company scenario and fewer than half would be less likely to trade in 
the market scenario knowing that insider trading is taking place.  A 
review of individual responses shows that a sizable number of 
participants who indicated a lower willingness to trade in the presence 
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are two explanations, each in the nature of a corner solution,258 that tell 
a different story about the market-confidence theory. 
Most favorably to the market-confidence theory, it is theoretically 
possible that all participants indicating that they would be discouraged 
from investing because of insider trading actually do not invest because 
of a belief that insider trading is taking place.  In this case, the 
percentages of respondents who would be less likely to invest in the 
stock market in the presence of insider trading are 48.2 and 43.3 
percent, as reported in Table 4. 
Least favorably to the market-confidence theory, nontraders who 
indicated that they would be less likely to invest in the presence of 
insider trading may not be trading anyway.  If that is the case, they can 
be discounted in determining the theory’s strength, and the actual 
percentage of respondents whom insider trading would deter drops to 
21.5 and 17.7 percent for the company-specific and broad-market 
scenarios. 
Because some might be less likely to invest due to insider trading 
but invest anyway,259 and some might be less likely to invest but not 
invest for other reasons, the actual percentage of individuals who would 
be deterred from investing because of insider trading is likely to be 
somewhere between these extreme figures.260  
Supporting the market-confidence theory, it is possible that the 
difference between the single-company and broad-market views 
indicates a desire to diversify away insider trading’s effects.  It may be 
that survey participants perceived insider trading to be “but one friction 
in the decision to be active in the equity markets.”261  To manage their 
perceived informational disadvantage vis-à-vis insiders while capturing 
 
 258 A corner solution is one where a single factor dominates.  See WALTER NICHOLSON, 
MICROECONOMIC THEORY: BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 103–05 (7th ed. 1998).  
 259 See supra text accompanying note 248; infra text accompanying note 262. 
 260 One estimate of the actual, in-between percentage for the broad-market scenario 
is 38.7 percent less likely to invest because of insider trading.  This figure is arrived at 
by, at the individual-response level, subtracting from the percentage of those who 
indicated a lower likelihood of investing in the presence of “common” insider trading, 
supra Table 4: Willingness to Trade in the Presence of Insider Trading, those who 
indicated both that they believed insider trading to be very rare or rare and that they 
did not invest, see supra notes 243–46.  That is, they would not be dissuaded from 
investing because insider trading is merely very rare or rare, but nonetheless do not 
trade, suggesting that something other than insider trading is keeping them out of the 
market.  On the other hand, it may be that any amount of insider trading would keep 
them out of the market.  
  Performing the same calculation for the company-specific scenario yields 43.1 
percent.  This number is less reliable, however, because it compares a company-specific 
scenario to broad-market participation.  Cf. supra notes 243–46. 
 261 Wagner, supra note 214. 
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the still-higher returns that stock markets offer, individuals may favor 
investing in the broad market over an individual stock.262 
Participants indicating a lower willingness to invest in a company 
whose stock was being traded based on inside information were asked 
what it was about insider trading that changed their willingness to buy.  
The responses are presented in Table 5. 
Table 5: Answers to “What is it about insider trading that would make 
you less willing to buy?”263 
Unfair advantage/imperfect information  25.0% 
It is immoral and unethical 21.1% 
It is illegal 15.2% 
It increases price instability and uncertainty 7.3% 
It means the company is not a good investment 6.6% 
It means prices are not accurate reflections of firm value 5.6% 
It attracts the attention of regulators and innocent investors 
might be implicated 
4.9% 
Cannot trust the company 4.4% 
It increases corruption and can ruin the corporation 4.1% 
 
Of these responses, 48.6 percent focused on the effect that insider 
trading would have on the short- or long-run value of the respondent’s 
would-be investment.264  Of this 48.6 percent, 37.9 percent focused on 
clearly confidence-related factors, 4.1 percent focused on 
information-revealing factors related to trust issues at the company, 
and 6.6 percent focused on the purely information-revealing factor that 
something was wrong at the company.265  The trust-related category 
 
 262 See id.; supra text accompanying notes 248, 259.  In other words, diversification 
may be seen as a tool to reduce perceived insider trading risk just as it may be used to 
reduce other risk.  If this is the case, it suggests that a meaningful number of respondents 
may have understood that participating in pooled-account investing involves investing 
in the stock market.  See supra text accompanying notes 176–77, 211. 
 263 10.3 percent of answers were blank or nonresponsive. 
 264 Included in this total are the answers indicating a belief that insider trading: 
provides an unfair advantage to the insider or imperfect information in the market (25 
percent); increases price instability (7.3 percent); means that the company is not a good 
investment (6.6 percent); means that prices are not an accurate reflection of market 
value (5.6 percent); and increases corruption and can ruin the corporation (4.1 percent). 
 265 The confidence-related factors are the sum of the 25-percent, 7.3-percent, and 
5.6-percent lines in Table 5.  The trust-related factor is the 4.1-percent line.  The purely 
information-revealing factor is the 6.6-percent line. 
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lends some support to the market-confidence hypothesis, with the 
caveat that it should be viewed in the context of the current regulatory 
environment in which insider trading is illegal.  Even potential investors 
who consider insider trading to be nonproblematic may consider it a 
sign of untrustworthiness to engage in illegal activity.266 
21.1 percent said that they would be less willing to buy because 
insider trading is immoral or unethical, and 15.2 percent said that their 
decreased willingness was driven by insider trading’s illegality, for a 
total of 36.3 percent.  These answers suggest several possibilities.  
Respondents may not have liked the feeling of getting their hands dirty 
by being potentially involved, for better or worse, in unethical or illegal 
activity.  Relatedly, it may be a proxy for one of the other answers, like 
the 4.9 percent expressing fear that insider trading by others would 
attract regulators who would implicate innocent investors in the crime.  
They may be non-sequitur answers, perhaps suggesting that the 
respondents did not understand the question, since the 
respondents—the would-be investors—were not the ones whom the 
question posited were engaging in the insider trading and thus the 
perceived misbehavior. 
The 17.5 percent responding that they would be more likely to 
invest in a company where insiders were trading were invited to explain 
why the presence of insider trading would make them more willing to 
buy that stock.  Table 6 presents the results. 
  
 
 266 Participants presumably assumed that the company, as an entity, either knew 
about its insiders’ trading, did not adequately police its insiders, or otherwise did not do 
enough to prevent the illegal activity.  They may view the trust-related aspects of insider 
trading differently under an issuer-licensing regulatory regime.  See infra text 
accompanying note 308.  
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Table 6: Reasons for being more willing to buy stock in a company if a 
small number of people were trading on inside information267 
Insider trading shows corporate confidence 31.4% 
Opportunity to make a profit 13.3% 
Personally like the corporation 8.0% 
Insider trading reveals information about the corporation 2.2% 
Don’t know, unsure 7.1% 
 
Although more than one-third of respondents declined to answer, 
33.6 percent gave purely information-revealing factors that the 
company was a good investment.  Of this 33.6 percent, 31.4 percent said 
that insider trading shows corporate confidence in the company, and 2.2 
percent responded more generally that the existence of insider trading 
reveals trade-worthy information about the corporation.  13.3 percent 
of participants indicated that insider trading by others revealed an 
opportunity to make a profit, suggesting either that they believed that 
the practice revealed information, or that it could actively help them 
realize abnormal returns.  The remaining 8 percent seemed to say either 
that they are unconcerned with insider trading, or that the presence of 
insider trading is a catalyst268 that confirms their positive intuitions 
about a company. 
More than one-third of participants gave nonresponsive answers.  
Although interpreting nonresponses is subject to uncertainty,269 it is 
worth cautiously considering them here given their high number 
(including when combined with the “don’t know/unsure” responses).  
This group may have an inarticulable sense that insider trading 
somehow benefits them. 
D.  Moral Views 
The survey next explored respondents’ intuitions about insider 
trading’s morality.  It directly asked participants their views and 
provided a base from which more nuanced analyses could be 
performed.  The next Section reports respondents’ stated moral views, 
and the one that follows it describes those which they may have 
revealed. 
 
 267 38.1 percent of answers were blank or nonresponsive. 
 268 See supra text accompanying notes 261–62. 
 269 See NONRESPONSE IN SOCIAL SCIENCE SURVEYS: A RESEARCH AGENDA, supra note 230, 
at 40–41. 
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1.  Stated Moral Positions 
Study participants were asked three direct questions informing the 
morality inquiry: (1) whether they would trade on inside information if 
it came into their possession; (2) whether they believed that insider 
trading was morally wrong; and (3) whether they believed that insider 
trading should be illegal.  Table 7 lays out the results. 
Table 7: Stated Moral Positions270 
 
 
Would you trade 
based on inside info? 
Is insider trading 
morally wrong? 
Should insider 
trading be illegal? 
 Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Overall 44.9% 55.1% 62.8% 35.5% 66.7% 33.3% 
Gender 
   Female 45.9% 54.1% 59.4% 39.3% 62.5% 37.5% 
   Male 43.6% 56.4% 66.7% 31.2% 71.5% 28.5% 
Race 
   Asian 56.1% 43.9% 56.1% 42.4% 62.1% 37.9% 
   Black 59.0% 41.0% 43.3% 55.1% 45.5% 54.5% 
   Latinx 61.5% 38.6% 45.8% 51.8% 48.2% 51.8% 
   Native Am. 66.7% 33.3% 58.3% 41.7% 58.3% 41.7% 
   White 39.7% 60.2% 68.6% 29.7% 72.6% 27.4% 
   Other 40.9% 59.1% 59.1% 40.9% 72.7% 27.3% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 51.3% 48.7% 66.5% 31.6% 71.3% 28.7% 
   Abstain 40.3% 59.7% 59.3% 39.3% 62.4% 37.6% 
 
Although 62.8 and 66.7 percent of respondents said that insider 
trading was morally wrong and should be illegal, 44.9 percent 
nevertheless stated that they would trade based on inside information.  
Stated differently, although most participants said that they would not 
trade on inside information, higher percentages of respondents 
indicated that insider trading was morally wrong or should be illegal. 
 
 270 See Appendix A, available at http://dx.doi.org/10.15786/20.500.11919/7122, 
for the survey questions as administered. 
ANDERSON, KIDD & MOCSARY (DO NOT DELETE) 4/16/2021  8:30 AM 
2021] PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF INSIDER TRADING 1091 
Women were more tolerant of insider trading than men, with fewer 
calling it morally wrong, fewer believing that it should be illegal, and 
more who would be willing to engage in it.  Participants of 
underrepresented races were substantially more tolerant of the 
practice than were White participants.  Notably, absolute majorities of 
Asian, Black, and Latinx respondents indicated a willingness to trade 
based on inside information. 
The young were far less likely to believe that insider trading is 
morally wrong or that it should be illegal, and a large majority would 
trade on nonpublic information if given the opportunity, as shown in 
Figure 5.  This may be the result of shorter exposure to hostile public 
discourse on the topic271 or less caution on the part of the young.272  
Figure 5: Acceptance of Insider Trading by Age 
 
As income and education rise, tolerance for insider trading 
declines, as shown in Figures 6 and 7.  Higher income is correlated with 
the beliefs that insider trading is morally wrong and should be illegal 
and inversely correlated with willingness to trade on inside information.  
Education shows similar, but weaker, correlations, with the least 
educated tending to be more tolerant of insider trading and the most 
educated less tolerant. 
 
 271 See supra text accompanying note 255; infra Section IV.E.2. 
 272 Peter Bossaerts & Carsten Murawski, Decision Neuroscience: Why We Become 
More Cautious with Age, 26 CURRENT BIO. 1634 (2016); Libby Kane, Young People Are 
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Figure 6: Acceptance of Insider Trading by Income 
 
Figure 7: Acceptance of Insider Trading by Education 
 
Perceived or actual financial need may influence these opinions.  
The less wealthy, who tend to be less educated,273 may believe that they 
do not have the luxury to look down on what the more affluent may view 
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A slight majority of active investors indicated a willingness to trade 
based on inside information if given the opportunity.  But they were also 
noticeably more likely than average to say that insider trading was 
morally wrong and should be illegal.274 
2.  Revealed Moral Positions 
Summary statistics of stated preferences tell only a partial story, 
serving as a starting point for further analysis.  Drilling down into 
individual participants’ answers revealed potential inconsistencies 
among a substantial number of respondents’ answers.  Analyzing these 
inconsistencies may yield more accurate insights into respondents’ true 
moral aversions to insider trading than do their directly expressed 
preferences. 
i.  Morality via Pragmatism 
Many respondents’ answers suggested that, as a practical matter, 
their actions would not correspond to their ethical beliefs.  At the 
individual response level, 18.1 percent of participants who stated that 
insider trading was immoral also indicated that they would 
nevertheless trade on the basis of inside information.275  This group 
appears to lack firm moral clarity.  Table 8 shows that 9.9 percent of 
respondents indicated that they did not believe insider trading to be 
unethical but would nonetheless abstain from trading on the basis of 
inside information.  This group appears to be cautious in its trading, 
presumably abstaining for fear of legal penalties. 
Starting with the respondents who describe insider trading as 
morally wrong and subtracting from that group those who also 
indicated that they would trade on the basis of inside 
information—those who exhibit moral disclarity—yields those 
respondents who are most certain that insider trading is unethical.  
Similarly, beginning with the number of respondents who decline to 
trade on inside information and subtracting those who indicated that 
their abstention was not based on moral grounds—the cautious 
abstainers—yields those scrupulous abstainers who would not trade on 
the basis of inside information because they truly believe that it is 
immoral. 
 
 274 Recall, however, that fewer than half of active traders said that they would be less 
likely to trade knowing that insider trading was pervasive.  See supra Table 4. 
 275 Similar results were observed in the scenario-based assessment of insider trading 
views.  See supra Section III.B.2.  Compare infra Figure 10 and Figure 11, with infra Figure 
12 and Figure 14. 
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Table 7 shows, at the summary level, participants’ answers to 
whether they would trade based on inside information and whether 
insider trading was morally wrong.  Table 8 shows the percentages of 
survey participants who exhibited moral disclarity, cautious abstention 
from trading, and, importantly, the percentages of respondents who 
exhibited moral certainty that insider trading is wrong and of those who 
would scrupulously abstain from insider trading because of their 
authentic belief that it should be illegal. 
Table 8: Practicality Versus Morality 
 
 
 276 The percentage of respondents who would trade based on inside information 
despite stating that they believed that insider trading is morally wrong. 
 277 The percentage of respondents who would not trade based on inside information 
despite stating that they believed that insider trading is not morally wrong. 
 278 This number is arrived at by starting with the number of respondents who state 
that they believe that insider trading is morally wrong, see supra Table 7, and subtracting 
those evincing moral disclarity (i.e., those who would trade based on inside information 
despite stating that insider trading is morally wrong), see supra note 276 and 
accompanying text. 
 279 This number is arrived at by starting with the number of respondents who refuse 
to trade based on inside information, see supra Table 1, and subtracting those who do so 











Overall 18.1% 9.9% 44.7% 45.2% 
Gender 
   Female  16.3% 10.9% 43.1% 43.3% 
   Male 20.0% 9.0% 46.6% 47.4% 
Race 
   Asian 21.2% 9.1% 34.9% 34.9% 
   Black 17.4% 14.6% 25.8% 26.4% 
   Latinx 21.7% 14.5% 24.1% 24.1% 
   Native Am. 25.0% 0.0% 33.3% 33.3% 
   White 17.7% 8.9% 50.8% 51.4% 
   Other 9.1% 9.1% 50.0% 50.0% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 23.0% 4.6% 43.5% 44.0% 
   Abstain 14.2% 14.2% 45.1% 45.5% 
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Moral certainty and scrupulous abstention are implicit measures of 
moral aversion to insider trading.  They are remarkably consistent 
within socioeconomic cohorts.  A few outliers notwithstanding, most 
cohorts exhibit little to no difference between the two measures, as 
shown in Figure 8.  The consistently small differences between these 
two derived measures suggest that most respondents’ stated views 
overestimate their moral aversion to insider trading.  This measure, 
therefore, provides some evidence that the actual percentage of 
respondents who believe that insider trading is immoral is likely less 
than 62.8 percent and could be as low as 44.7 percent. 
Figure 8: Moral Certainty Versus Scrupulous Abstention 
 
Men were less morally clear and women more cautious.  Revealed 
views by income, education, and age followed patterns similar to those 
expressed directly, but with a substantially lower absolute 
magnitude.280 
Among racial groups, Black participants were the most cautious, 
but also among the least morally unclear.  Native American respondents 
were the most morally unclear and the least cautious.  White 
participants were among the least cautious and only slightly less 
morally unclear than Black participants. 
Active investors’ revealed views fell much closer to the overall 
figures than their stated positions suggested.281 
  
 
 280 See supra Figure 6. 
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ii.  Morality via Legality 
Respondents’ views on the morality and legality of insider trading 
did not track consistently.282  As in the previous Section, these data can 
be used to measure more precisely the public’s preference for 
prohibition.  Table 9 shows that 16.0 percent of respondents have 
complex views on legality and morality.  6.5 percent are permissive, in 
that, despite believing that insider trading is immoral, they would not 
make it illegal.  But 9.5 percent are strict prohibitionists who would 
prohibit insider trading even though they do not believe that it is 
immoral. 
Starting with those who believe insider trading is immoral and 
subtracting from that group those who would not make it illegal yields 
a group that believes that insider trading is immoral and, therefore, 
should be banned.  Likewise, beginning with those who would like 
insider trading to be illegal and subtracting those that do not believe the 
practice to be immoral yields those who say that insider trading should 
be banned because it is immoral.  
If these two derived categories are logically similar, and if they are 
close to each other in value, they provide greater assurance that they 
more closely approximate the true percentage of the population that 
would like to ban insider trading.  The final two columns of Table 9 
contain these two measures and Figure 9 graphs the difference for each 
of the demographic cohorts.  As in the analysis performed in the 
previous Section, two outliers notwithstanding, the differential between 
the two measures is narrow across cohorts.  Under this measure, the 
likely percentage of Americans who believe insider trading should be 
illegal is between about 56 and 66.3 percent. 
Combined with the previous morality-via-pragmatism data, the 
percentage of participants believing that insider trading is immoral is 
likely bounded by about 44 percent on the low end and about 56 percent 
on the high end.  That is a substantial slice of society, but potentially less 
than the 50 percent that the two data points straddle.  That, in turn, 
raises questions about the legitimacy of insider trading laws.283 
  
 
 282 This may result partially from the belief that all that is immoral need not be illegal.  
See supra note 181.  Nevertheless, the differences between expressed moral and 
practical views is greater than the difference between expressed moral and legal views.  
Compare supra Table 8: Practicality Versus Morality, with infra Table 9. 
 283 See supra text accompanying notes 186–90. 
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Overall 6.5% 9.5% 56.3% 57.2% 
Gender 
   Female 6.7% 9.4% 52.6% 53.1% 
   Male 6.2% 9.8% 60.4% 61.7% 
Race 
   Asian 4.6% 9.1% 51.5% 53.0% 
   Black 9.6% 11.2% 33.7% 34.3% 
   Latinx 9.6% 12.1% 36.1% 36.1% 
   Native Am. 8.3% 8.3% 50.0% 50.0% 
   White 5.9% 9.0% 62.7% 63.6% 
   Other 0.0% 13.64% 59.1% 59.1% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 7.1% 10.5% 59.4% 60.8% 
   Abstain 6.2% 8.9% 53.1% 53.5% 
 
 
 284 The percentage of respondents who would not ban insider trading despite stating 
that they believed that insider trading is morally wrong. 
 285 The percentage of respondents who would ban insider trading despite stating that 
they believed that insider trading is not morally wrong. 
 286 “Immoral Therefore Ban.”  This number is arrived at by starting with the number 
of respondents who state that they believe that insider trading is morally wrong, see 
supra Table 7, and subtracting those evincing permissive views (i.e., those would not ban 
insider trading despite stating that they believed that insider trading is morally wrong), 
see supra note 284 and accompanying text. 
 287 “Ban Because Immoral.”  This number is arrived at by starting with the number of 
respondents who state that they would ban insider trading, see supra Table 7: Stated 
Moral Positions, and subtracting those who evince strict prohibitionist views, see supra 
note 285 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 9: Immoral-Therefore-Ban versus Ban-Because-Immoral288 
 
Differences between cohorts were slight.  Men were less 
permissive than women, but well within the margin of error.  Asian and 
White participants were less likely, and Black and Latinx participants 
more likely, to be permissive.  There were no clear trends apparent in 
the data along age, education, or income lines.  Active traders were more 
likely to believe that insider trading should be banned. 
3.  Self-Conscious Punishment Views 
Fear of punishment amid more frequent enforcement actions, 
increased public chatter about the topic, or both, may explain why only 
45 percent of respondents indicated that they would trade based on 
inside information, as compared with 53 and 55 percent in the 1986 
surveys.289  If insider trading is to be illegal, violations of the law must, 
presumably, be punished.  Each respondent who indicated that insider 
trading should be illegal was, therefore, asked to identify the 
appropriate punishment for a violation of the law. 
Participants were first asked what the appropriate punishment 
should be, in the abstract, for an insider trading violation.  Immediately 
following, they were asked what the punishment should be for 
themselves, should they be found guilty of insider trading.  Respondents 
could choose between high fines (greater than $100,000), low fines (less 
than $100,000), minor jail time (less than 1 year in prison), or major jail 
time (more than 1 year in prison).  It is generally accepted that fines 




 288 In mathematical terms, (Immoral ∴ Ban) ≏ (Ban ∵ Immoral). 
 289 See supra Table 1. 
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The survey presented the two questions in sequence, which would 
ordinarily reduce any disparity between the two responses because 
people generally try to avoid obvious self-contradiction.291  
Nevertheless, respondents differed significantly in what they believed 
would be an appropriate punishment, largely in the direction of their 
being more lenient with themselves than with others who were caught 
insider trading.  Table 10 shows the percentages of respondents who 
chose high and low fines as the proper punishment in the abstract, high 
and low fines for themselves, and the change vis-à-vis jail time for 
themselves versus in the abstract. 
  
 
 291 See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF 
EXPERT TESTIMONY § 7:20 (database updated Nov. 2019) (noting that, as here, 
question-order effects are minimized if general questions precede specific ones); Jon A. 
Krosnick & Stanley Presser, Question and Questionnaire Design, in HANDBOOK OF SURVEY 
RESEARCH 264, 280 (Peter V. Marsden & James D. Wright eds., 2d ed. 2010) (same).  
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Table 10: Fines for Thee Versus Fines for Me292 




for My Insider 
Trading Change293 
 LF HF Total LF HF Total LF HF Net 
Overall 18.6% 32.5% 51.1% 26.3% 30.8% 57.1% 7.7% -1.7% 5.9% 
Gender 
   Female 22.1% 35.0% 57.0% 28.7% 34.3% 62.9% 6.6% -0.7% 5.9% 
   Male 15.3% 30.3% 45.5% 23.8% 27.8% 51.6% 8.5% -2.5% 6.0% 
Race 
   Asian 22.0% 24.4% 46.3% 29.3% 17.1% 46.3% 7.3% -7.3% 0.0% 
   Black 21.0% 28.4% 48.4% 28.4% 32.1% 60.5% 7.4% 3.7% 11.1% 
   Latinx 17.5% 32.5% 50.0% 22.5% 40.0% 62.5% 5.0% 7.5% 12.5% 
   Native Am. 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 28.6% 0.0% 28.6% 14.3% 0.0% 14.3% 
   White 18.2% 33.9% 52.1% 25.9% 31.7% 57.6% 7.7% -2.2% 5.5% 
   Other 18.8% 31.3% 50.0% 25.0% 18.8% 43.8% 6.3% -12.5% -5.3% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 17.0% 31.0% 48.0% 25.0% 30.0% 55.0% 8.0% -1.0% 7.0% 
   Abstain 20.1% 33.1% 53.2% 27.3% 30.2% 57.4% 7.2% -2.9% 4.3% 
 
Slightly more than half of the participants chose fines as the proper 
penalty for insider trading in the abstract, with a strong majority of 
those participants choosing high fines.  When asked about the 
appropriate punishment for themselves, a higher percentage chose 
fines, with the increase coming in the form of an increased preference 
for the least severe penalty, lower fines. 
Women were more likely to recommend fines in both the abstract 
and for themselves and were slightly more consistent than men.  Native 
American respondents were substantially less likely to recommend 
fines in both scenarios. 
 
 292 “LF” stands for low fines, “HF” stands for high fines. 
 293 These columns show the total changes in the percentages of respondents 
choosing low fines, high fines, and fines generally when selecting the appropriate 
punishment for themselves versus the appropriate punishment for insider trading in the 
abstract.  An increase (decrease) in the Net column indicates the percentage of 
respondents who preferred (did not prefer) fines to jail time when they, rather than an 
abstract individual, were subject to the penalty. 
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The highest shifts from jail time to fines were exhibited by Black, 
Latinx, and Native American respondents along the race dimension; 
those with some high school along educational lines; those between the 
ages of 35 and 54; and the very conservative, liberal, and communist by 
ideology. 
Nearly every cohort saw an increase in the preference for fines 
when faced with how to punish themselves for insider trading; those 
with doctoral degrees and the very liberal decreased the total 
preference for fines, preferring prison time.  Every cohort, save four that 
saw no change,294 saw an increase in the preference for low fines, 
indicating that any overall decrease in preference for fines among those 
two groups was the result of a shift from high fines to jail time.  Table 11 
shows the percentages of respondents who chose major and minor jail 
time as the proper punishment in the abstract and for themselves, and 
the change vis-à-vis jail time for themselves versus in the abstract. 
  
 
 294 Of the cohorts that saw no change, one involved a single participant who indicated 
no formal education and three participants who did not identify as male or female. 
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Table 11: Jail for Thee Versus Jail for Me295 




for My Insider 
Trading Change vs. Fines296 
 MiJ MaJ Total MiJ MaJ Total MiJ MaJ Net 
Overall 20.3% 28.0% 48.3% 16.0% 25.6% 41.6% -4.3% -2.4% -6.7% 
Gender 
   Female 20.0% 22.8% 42.7% 15.0% 20.7% 35.7% -4.9% -2.1% -7.0% 
   Male 20.9% 33.0% 53.8% 17.0% 30.3% 47.3% -3.8% -2.7% -6.5% 
Race 
   Asian 4.9% 48.8% 53.7% 14.6% 39.0% 53.7% 9.8% -9.8% -0.0% 
   Black 23.5% 27.2% 50.6% 17.3% 19.8% 37.0% -6.2% -7.4% -13.6% 
   Latinx 27.5% 22.5% 50.0% 17.5% 15.0% 32.5% -10.0% -7.5% -17.5% 
   Native Am. 42.9% 42.9% 85.7% 42.9% 28.6% 71.4% 0.0% -14.3% -14.3% 
   White 20.2% 27.2% 47.4% 15.4% 26.0% 41.4% -4.8% -1.2% -6.0% 
   Other 25.0% 25.0% 50.0% 25.0% 31.3% 56.3% 0.0% 6.3% 6.3% 
Trading Status 
   Invest 19.5% 32.0% 51.5% 16.0% 27.5% 43.5% -3.5% -4.5% -8.0% 
   Abstain 21.4% 25.0% 46.4% 16.7% 24.8% 41.4% -4.7% -0.2% -5.0% 
 
Fewer than half of respondents chose jail time as the appropriate 
punishment for insider trading in the abstract.  That number declined 
by 6.7 percent when the punishment was to be inflicted on themselves.  
Men had a stronger preference for jail time, though that preference 
declined by as much as it did for women when the punishment was to 
be inflicted upon themselves. 
 
 295 “MiJ” stands for minor jail time; “MaJ” stands for major jail time. 
 296 These columns show the total changes in the percentages of respondents 
choosing minor jail time, major jail time, and jail time generally when selecting the 
appropriate punishment for themselves versus the appropriate punishment for insider 
trading in the abstract.  An increase (decrease) in the Net column indicates the 
percentage of respondents who preferred (did not prefer) jail time to fines when they, 
rather than an abstract individual, were subject to the penalty. 
  Because some respondents did not answer all questions, the change from jail time 
to fines, see supra columns accompanying note 293, and the change from fines to jail 
time are not mirror images. 
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Asian participants, Native American participants, and those 
earning more than $75,000 but less than $100,000 preferred jail time as 
a general punishment and self-punishment.  Table 12 shows additional 
summary statistics. 














31.4% 6.7% 12.7% 8.8% 22.6% 11.2% 
 
LF to HF LF to MaJ LF to MiJ HF to LF HF to Maj HF to MiJ 
2.1% 0.3% 1.3% 5.1% 2.6% 2.5% 
 
MiJ to HF MiJ to LF MiJ to MaJ MaJ to HF MaJ to LF MaJ to MiJ 
4.0% 3.5% 2.5% 2.6% 2.5% 2.3% 
 
When confronted with the possibility that they might suffer the 
punishment, 31.4 percent of respondents changed their answers.  More 
than twice as many participants chose a more lenient punishment for 
themselves.  Almost half of those switching to a more lenient penalty 
switched to low fines, the least severe punishment. 
Punishments should not, of course, be based solely on what 
individuals would choose for themselves.  But the analysis does inform 
the coherence of public views about insider trading.  The significant 
disparity between what participants choose for others and what they 
choose for themselves suggests moral ambiguity regarding appropriate 
punishment for these crimes. 
* * * 
Public opinions about the morality of and appropriate punishment 
for insider trading appear unstable.  Because public intuition about the 
blameworthiness of criminalized conduct is so important, this 
instability counsels that insider trading law and policy be carefully 
considered. 
E.  Fiduciary Instincts and Propaganda 
The survey’s next stage had two important goals.  First, it 
attempted to measure more precisely moral and pragmatic views on 
insider trading.  Respondents were asked to imagine themselves in the 
shoes of various individuals in possession of material nonpublic 
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information in various situations.  Each of the five scenarios implicated 
a different potential fiduciary responsibility.297  Second, the survey 
sought to discern the firmness of the views expressed in the scenarios.  
The survey presented participants with brief statements extolling the 
harmfulness, irrelevance, or virtue of insider trading—the 
propaganda—followed by three follow-up scenarios analogous to three 
of the five original scenarios.298  Section III.B.2, supra, details the varying 
paths through this portion of the survey. 
The next Section describes respondents’ expressed fiduciary views 
based on their pre-propaganda answers to questions in the ethical and 
pragmatic tracks composing this portion of the survey.  The one after 
that describes the effect of propaganda on survey participants’ follow-
up answers. 
1.  Revealed Fiduciary Views 
Allowing survey participants to express their views indirectly via 
scenario-based questions provided a glimpse into their thought 
processes that direct questioning could not.  The key findings are 
presented here.299 
i.  Ethical Track 
Figures 10 through 12 show the percentages of the ethics cohort 
indicating that it would be ethical to trade on nonpublic information in 
each of the various scenarios.  Each figure compares either the answers 
provided in two of the ethical subtracks or the answers provided for the 
small and large corporations.  Figure 10 shows the effect of reversing 
the order in which respondents heard the scenarios.  It is well known 
that the order in which questions are asked can affect the responses,300 
and that was true here.  It was anticipated that participants might 
answer differently when hearing the most obvious case of insider 
trading—the CEO—or the least obvious—the quasi-stranger—first.  
Hearing the CEO example first, for example, may have primed 
respondents to distrust the following scenarios, even as the scenarios 
drifted further from the obvious case.  Instead, the opposite occurred: 
 
 297 As opposed to a fiduciary duty.  Not all scenarios presented situations in which 
trading would have been illegal.  The goal was to learn respondents’ feelings about each 
situation. 
 298 See supra notes 203–04 and accompanying text; Figure 1.  Appendix A, available 
at http://dx.doi.org/10.15786/20.500.11919/7122, contains the text of the questions 
in each of the four subtracks. 
 299 The complete result set is available in Appendix B. 
 300 See supra note 291. 
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those who began with the neighbor scenario were more likely to find 
every succeeding scenario more ethically problematic. 
Figure 10: Effect of Reversing Ethical Track Scenario Presentation Order 
 
One explanation for this phenomenon is that respondents may 
have never considered a quasi-stranger insider trading scenario.  
Understanding that the survey was about insider trading, they may have 
been primed to consider any scenario as ethically questionable.  The 
anchor301 for the reverse cohort may therefore have applied to the least 
problematic scenario, with every successive scenario progressing into 
more problematic territory.  If this is correct, it may be evidence that 
participants initially outsourced their views about insider trading,302 
but were willing to adjust those views when presented with nuanced 
situations eliciting critical thinking.  Nevertheless, the trend shows that 
the more clearly an insider someone was, the less acceptable insider 
trading was thought to be.  Figure 11 shows the contrast between 
respondents’ ethical views about trading in the stock of the smaller 
corporation, with which they had a relationship ranging from direct to 
tangential, and about trading in the stock of the larger corporation, with 
which they had no relationship under the scenarios. 
 
 301 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, SCIENCE, Sept. 27, 1974, at 1124 (describing the anchoring heuristic, under 
which individuals tend to depend heavily on the initial piece of information that they 
receive about a topic). 
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Figure 11: Differences in Ethical Views Between the Related and 
Unrelated Company 
 
Respondents were more likely to find it acceptable to trade in the 
stock of the unrelated, larger, corporation.  The shrinking differential 
between the two subtracks tracks a shrinking personal connection to 
the small company. 
Recall that under the classical theory, the harm of insider trading is 
said to stem from an insider’s breach of a duty to current or prospective 
shareholder-counterparties.303  Under the misappropriation theory, the 
harm of insider trading is a betrayal of the insider’s duties to the source 
(in this case, the small company) of the information.304  Trading in the 
small company’s shares thus implicates both the classical and 
misappropriation theories of liability, at least for the CEO, employee, 
and outside accountant.305  Trading in the other, large company’s stock 
in the same three scenarios implicates only the misappropriation 
theory. 
 
 303 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 37–39. 
 304 Id. at 47. 
 305 The friend small-company scenario might fall under the classical theory based on 
tippee liability, or an expansive view of misappropriation liability.  The neighbor 
small-company scenario could not fall under either form of liability.  Neither 
large-company scenario could fall under classical liability.  The friend large-company 
scenario might fall under an expansive view of misappropriation liability, but the 
neighbor large-company scenario would not. 
  Views about both the friend and neighbor scenarios, however, are likely 
influenced by social norms that resemble the misappropriation theory.  That is, 
respondents may have viewed negatively acting on information from an intoxicated 
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The consistent differences in attitudes between trading in the small 
and large companies (by the CEO, employee, and accountant) suggest 
that there were some respondents whose intuitions aligned with either 
the classical theory or the misappropriation theory, but not both.  If all 
respondents found the classical and misappropriation theories equally 
compelling, one would not expect these differences.  The survey did not 
instruct respondents on the nature of any theories of insider trading.  
Figure 12 shows the contrast between the original subtrack and the 
one that was told that the small corporation officially and expressly 
permitted insiders306 to trade on material nonpublic information.  It was 
anticipated that participants’ ethical qualms about insider trading 
would be reduced when they were told that permission had been given. 
Figure 12: Effect of Granting the CEO Permission to Trade 
There was a slight increase in the affirmative response in the CEO 
scenario, but within the margin of error.  This part of the survey 
provided only marginal evidence of an intuitive foundation for the 
misappropriation theory.  Under that theory, the owner of the material 
nonpublic information could, theoretically, grant permission to insiders 
and others to use it, in which case it would not be a violation of the 
trader’s duty and, therefore, not be illegal.307  The same can be said of 
 
 306 “Your corporation has officially granted officers, directors, and employees, 
including you, permission to trade on inside information” was added to the scenario 
asking the respondent to assume the role of the firm’s CEO.  The other questions in the 
series of scenarios did not contain the addition.  See Appendix A. 
 307 See, e.g., United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 689 n.5 (1997) (Thomas, J., 
concurring in part) (noting that the government had conceded that “if [the defendant in 
Carpenter] had gone to the Wall Street Journal and said . . . you’re not paying me very 
much.  I’d like to make a little bit more money by buying stock, the stocks that are going 
to appear in my Heard on the Street column, and the Wall Street Journal said, that’s fine, 
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the proposed issuer-licensing approach to insider trading, under which 
trading is allowed by insiders if it is explicitly authorized by the 
corporation.308 
Similar questions were asked of the pragmatic track, discussed 
next. 
ii.  Pragmatic Track 
Respondents in the pragmatic track were straightforwardly asked 
whether they would trade in the various scenarios.  The goal was to 
isolate the impact of the fear of legal consequences on the willingness to 
insider trade, without reference to the transactions’ ethics.  One might 
expect less change between items compared in the pragmatic track 
because it was supposed to be about pragmatism rather than morals.  
Question ordering, anchoring effects, and so forth should have had less 
impact on someone concerned solely with pragmatics.  This effect, while 
present, appeared not to completely displace respondents’ ethical 
considerations.  Stated differently, ethical considerations are necessary 
elements of pragmatic decisions.309  Making money by trading on 
material nonpublic information may not be worth it if it makes one feel 
bad about oneself. 
Another factor, perceived reliability of the nonpublic information, 
seemingly influenced pragmatic decisions.  The further the source was 
from oneself, the less reliable the information, and the less likely 
someone concerned with pragmatics would be to trade on it. 
Figures 13 through 16 show the percentages of the pragmatic 
cohort indicating that they would trade on nonpublic information in 
each of the various scenarios.  Each Figure compares either the answers 
provided in two of the ethical subtracks or the answers provided for the 
small and large corporations.  Figure 13 shows a similar anchoring effect 
of reversing scenario order as in the ethical track,310 although the 
difference disappears in the neighbor scenario, in which 
pragmatic-track respondents were less likely to say that they would 
trade on inside information. 
 
 308 ANDERSON, supra note 17, at 243–46. 
 309 See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 194 (11th ed. 1812) (“Man 
naturally desires, not only to be loved, but to be lovely.”). 
 310 See supra note 301 and surrounding text. 
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Figure 13: Effect of Reversing Pragmatic-Track Scenario Presentation 
Order 
 
In the original scenario, participants started at roughly the same 
point as in the corresponding ethical scenario.311  As they moved 
through the subtrack, however, their responses stayed flatter, not rising 
as high as in the ethical one.312  This may indicate that they were 
focusing on pragmatics, as was the goal of this track, and were less 
willing to trade because they saw the information sources as 
progressively less reliable.  Nevertheless, there was an upward trend in 
the data, potentially suggesting, especially when combined with other 
findings in this section, that ethical considerations seeped into 
participants’ analyses.313  
In the reverse subtrack, respondents also started at roughly the 
same point and the change in their responses was again flatter than in 
the corresponding ethical scenario, but the effect was less 
pronounced.314  Figure 14 shows the contrast between respondents’ 
willingness to trade in the stock of the smaller corporation and that of 
the larger corporation.  As in the previous comparison, the difference 
was smaller in the pragmatic track than the ethical track,315 and the 
contrast fades in the later scenarios. 
 
 
 311 See supra Figure 10. 
 312 Id. 
 313 See infra text accompanying note 317; supra note 309 and accompanying text. 
 314 See supra Figure 10. 
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Respondents may, again, have been more reluctant to trust the 
profitability of information that was further removed from a reliable 
source.  This includes the possibility that information about the larger 
company may have been viewed as less reliable because it was further 
removed from the information’s source, who was connected to the 
smaller company.  The combination of these two greater separations 
(between the source and the respondent, and the source and potential 
target) may explain why there is no meaningful difference between 
willingness to invest in the small and large firm in the later scenarios. 
Figure 15 shows the contrast between the subtrack whose 
respondents were told that they could trade “without getting caught” 
and the one that did not receive that additional instruction.316  One 
would expect, ex ante, that reminding respondents they could trade 
without getting caught would lower their assessments of the cost of 
trading on inside information.  That, in turn, should have increased the 
net benefit of insider trading and led to an increase in willingness to 
trade.  Instead, the group that was told it could trade without getting 
caught showed a lower willingness to trade on inside information in 
every situation but the neighbor scenario. 
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Those who were told that they could trade without getting caught 
may have been primed to think of insider trading as morally wrong.  
Instead of reducing the cost of insider trading, the instruction increased 
its moral salience, and thus the costs of engaging in it.  Ethical 
considerations, in other words, appear to have been transformed into 
pragmatic ones via respondents’ consciences.317  Participants in the 
without-getting-caught subtrack exhibited a clear decline in willingness 
to trade in both the small and large corporations as the scenarios 
progressed, as Figure 16 shows.  This again suggests that participants 
viewed the information in the later scenarios as less reliable. 
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Figure 16: Differences Between the Related and Unrelated Company 
when “Without Getting Caught” Is Removed from the Scenario 
Description 
 
2.  Propaganda is Effective 
The written-and-spoken expositions presenting positive, neutral, 
or negative effects of insider trading318 had both obvious and 
less-obvious effects on study participants’ willingness to countenance 
trading on material nonpublic information, as well as their willingness 
to engage in it.  Figure 17 contrasts the pre- and post-propaganda 
answers of the original ethical track.  After having been exposed to the 
propaganda, respondents were increasingly willing to condone insider 
trading in the CEO scenario but less willing in the Outside Accountant 
scenario. 
Figure 17: Effect of Propaganda on the Ethical Track 
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The effect is also present in Figure 18, which shows the contrast 
between the pre- and post-propaganda answers of the subtrack that was 
told, in the CEO scenario, that the small corporation granted permission 
to employees to trade on inside information.  After exposure to 
propaganda, participants exhibited a reduced willingness to condone 
insider trading in the Employee and Outside Accountant scenarios.  
Figure 18: Effect of Propaganda on the Ethical Track with Permission to 
Trade Given in CEO Scenario 
 
Figures 19 and 20 show the impact of propaganda on the original 
pragmatic subtrack and on the subtrack that was not told that it could 
trade “without getting caught.”  In the original pragmatic subtrack, 
exposure to propaganda led to a decreased willingness to engage in 
insider trading in the Outside Accountant scenario.  For participants 
who were not told they could trade without getting caught, exposure to 
propaganda led to a decreased willingness to engage in insider trading 
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Figure 19: Effect of Propaganda on the Pragmatic Track 
 
Figure 20: Effect of Propaganda on the Pragmatic-Track Group Told 
That It Could Trade “Without Getting Caught” 
 
 
The effect of propaganda in these scenarios is a net effect, and 
participants were equally likely to be exposed to pro-trading, neutral, 
and anti-trading propaganda.  The expected net effect should therefore 
be zero, and nonzero effects are evidence that participants’ views on 
insider trading are susceptible to change and may not be firmly held. 
Further evidence is provided by Table 13, which identifies the 
percentage of respondents who changed their responses 
post-propaganda.  It includes both those who became more permissive 
or more willing and those who became less so.  The study did not track 
which piece of propaganda was presented to each participant because 
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neutral, pro-trading) of propaganda, but rather to gauge whether public 
views on the ethics and pragmatics of insider trading were firmly held. 
Table 13: Post-Propaganda Change of Opinion  
(Own Corporation Only)319 
Ethical Path 
  No Explicit Permission 
    CEO 29.0% 
    Employee 21.4% 
    Accountant 26.0% 
    Friend 17.0% 
    Neighbor 18.7% 
  Explicit Permission for CEO 
    CEO 26.4% 
    Employee 21.7% 
    Accountant 23.1% 
    Friend 19.6% 
    Neighbor 15.2% 
Pragmatic Path 
  “Without Getting Caught” 
    CEO 17.0% 
    Employee 14.0% 
    Accountant 16.5% 
    Friend 9.3% 
    Neighbor 8.2% 
  No “Without Getting Caught” 
    CEO 25.5% 
    Employee 17.2% 
    Accountant 20.4% 
    Friend 18.9% 
    Neighbor 11.1% 
 
 319 See supra text accompanying note 204. 
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In four cases, more than a quarter of participants were swayed by 
the propaganda, and greater than a tenth were swayed in all but two 
scenarios.  Propaganda was most influential in the CEO scenario, the one 
most clearly a violation of insider trading laws as currently enforced.  
The CEO scenario is perhaps the most salient to the public discussion, 
reinforcing that the public’s views of insider trading are not fixed.  
Respondents’ views appear to be less firm than public chatter (which is 
also propaganda, in effect, if not intent) would suggest. 
It may be, as Professor Jeffrey Wagner noted, that “the 
‘propaganda’ generated elastic responses .  .  .  because insider 
trading .  .  .  is not straightforward for the median voter to 
grasp .  .  .  and the pro/neutral/con scenarios provided by the 
survey [we]re probably more detail[ed] and nuance[d] than most 
survey respondents ha[d] ever considered.”320 
3.  Instincts About the Nature of Information 
The survey consistently illumined respondents’ instincts that 
inside information belonged to its source.321  Table 14 provides a 
second, individual-response-level look at respondents’ moral 
acceptance of trading, and willingness to trade, in the stock of each 
company in the ethical and pragmatic tracks.  It shows (1) the 
percentage of respondents who were willing to trade only in the stock 
of the smaller company with which they had at least a tangential 




 320 Wagner, supra note 214. 
 321 See supra text accompanying Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12. 
 322 Figure 11 and Figure 14 show aggregate data for the ethical and pragmatic tracks. 
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Table 14: Acceptance or Willingness to Trade in Own vs. Other Company 
 Only Own Corporation Only Other Corporation 
Ethical Path 
  No Explicit Permission 
    CEO 6.5% 19.5% 
    Employee 5.9% 14.2% 
    Accountant 7.7% 11.2% 
    Friend 7.1% 11.8% 
    Neighbor 7.1% 8.3% 
  Explicit Permission for CEO 
    CEO 2.5% 13.0% 
    Employee 6.8% 9.9% 
    Accountant 5.6% 6.8% 
    Friend 5.6% 6.8% 
    Neighbor 8.6% 8.6% 
Pragmatic Path 
  “Without Getting Caught” 
    CEO 6.2% 12.9% 
    Employee 6.2% 9.4% 
    Accountant 4.1% 7.1% 
    Friend 7.4% 7.1% 
    Neighbor 6.2% 8.2% 
  No “Without Getting Caught” 
    CEO 10.0% 11.8% 
    Employee 4.7% 10.0% 
    Accountant 4.7% 9.4% 
    Friend 7.1% 5.3% 
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In most subtracks, respondents were more likely to say that it was 
acceptable to trade in the larger corporation’s stock than in their own.  
This suggests an intuition that trading on one’s own company is betrayal 
or theft.  The results stand out in the CEO scenarios, where the betrayal 
would be the most profound.  Where permission to insider trade was 
not given, nearly one-fifth of participants indicated an acceptance of, or 
willingness to trade in, the stock of the other company but not their own.  
When permission was given, that number was halved, presumably 
because many respondents who would have traded in the other 
company’s stock anyway now also found it acceptable to trade in their 
own company’s stock.323 
V.  RESEARCH AGENDA 
As expected, this survey illuminated important areas for further 
investigation.  Four additional studies are therefore planned. 
The next study will be a more nuanced and in-depth survey of how 
and why the public forms its views on insider trading.  This study, for 
example, showed that the public’s views on insider trading are not 
firmly held.  The next survey will focus more specifically on the 
rationales for expressed opinions.  What, for example, is it about the 
diverse American experience that prompts the different attitudes 
revealed herein?  How do public perceptions of insider trading, 
including the appropriateness of punitive measures, compare with 
those of other crimes?  A more detailed and focused survey instrument 
could elicit answers to such questions.  
This study also offered limited support for the market-confidence 
theory of insider trading, but arguably not sufficient support to validate 
market confidence as the principal basis for the current insider trading 
regime.  The third study, therefore, will measure the market-level effects 
of several large insider trading events, including the publication of 
important judicial decisions, news of criminal indictments, and SEC 
prosecutions, to determine their effects on market performance.  It will 
also measure the industry-level and company-specific effects of known 
insider trading schemes. 
Finally, this study focused on a census-representative population, 
rather than on the opinions of financial professionals.  As noted in 
Section II.B.2, however, much controversy centers on the question of 
how these professionals react to insider trading in the marketplace.  The 
fourth study will, therefore, comprise a series of surveys and interviews 
 
 323 There were, of course, respondents who believed that it was morally permissible 
to, or who would, trade in the stock of either or neither corporation. 
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with the market constituents who would be most directly impacted by 
any proposed statutory reform.  It will collect opinions from 
stakeholders like market makers, hedge fund managers, securities 
analysts, issuer representatives, and compliance attorneys.  As part of 
these surveys and interviews, participants will be asked to opine on the 
likely effects of potential legislative language to reform the insider 
trading regime. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Efforts to reform America’s insider trading regime must be 
informed by the public’s moral intuitions, lest the efforts fail in the long 
run.  Yet pending reform proposals proceed without the benefit of data 
reflecting actual public attitudes.  Others have sounded this warning, but 
this survey provides the most comprehensive analysis of public opinion 
to date.  It charts a path for future research.  
This survey opens the lid on what used to be a black box and 
reveals a reality that tempers many prior assumptions about insider 
trading.  The study reflects significant public ambivalence about the 
wrongfulness of insider trading, with opposition concentrated largely 
among the older, wealthier, and more educated.  Public opinion also 
seems unstable, subject to internal inconsistencies, and easily affected 
by propaganda.  Questions remain, especially about foundational 
concepts such as the market-confidence theory and the moral bases for 
the existing theories of liability.  Complete answers to these and other 
questions await further study, but reform efforts must take both the 
questions and answers seriously. 
 
